

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ALEX E. RINEHART, On Behalf of	:	
Himself And All Others Similarly Situated,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
vs.	:	Civil Action No: 08 Civ. 5598 (MGC)
	:	
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC.,	:	
Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Michael L. Ainslie,	:	
John F. Akers, Roger Berlind, Thomas H.	:	
Cruikshank, Marsha Johnson Evans,	:	
Christopher Gent, Roland A. Hernandez,	:	
Henry Kaufman, John D. Macomber, Erin	:	
M. Callan, Wendy M. Uvino, The	:	
Employee Benefit Plans Committee, and	:	
John Does 1-10,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>		X
JO ANNE BUZZO, individually and on	:	
behalf of all others similarly situated,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	Civil Action No: 08 Civ. 6245 (UA)
vs.	:	
	:	
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC.,	:	
Wendy M. Uvino, Lehman Brothers	:	
Holdings Inc. Employee Benefit Plans	:	
Committee, John Does 1-10, Henry	:	
Kaufman, John F. Akers, Roger S. Berlind,	:	
Marsha Johnson Evans and Roland A.	:	
Hernandez.	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>		X
MONIQUE MILLER FONG, On Behalf Of	:	
Herself And All Others Similarly Situated,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
vs.	:	Civil Action No: 08 Civ. 6282 (UA)
	:	

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., :  
RICHARD S. FULD, JR., MICHAEL L. :  
AINSLIE, JOHN F. AKERS, ROGER S. :  
BERLIND, THOMAS H. CRUIKSHANK, :  
MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS, SIR :  
CHRISTOPHER GENT, JERRY A. :  
GRUNDHOFER, ROLAND A. :  
HERNANDEZ, HENRY KAUFMAN, :  
JOHN D. MACOMBER, ERIN M. :  
CALLAN, WENDY M. UVINO, THE :  
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS :  
COMMITTEE, and JOHN DOES 1-10, :  
:  
Defendants. :  
-----x

### **DECLARATION OF ROBERT A. IZARD**

I, Robert A. Izard, declare as follows:

1. I am a Partner in the law firm Izard Nobel L.L.P.
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of portions of a transcript of proceedings in In re Merck Sec., ERISA and Deriv. Litig., No. 05-1157 (D.N.J.), on April 18, 2005.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a Case Management Order issued in In re Tyco International, Ltd. Sec. Litig., Case No. 02-1335 (D.N.H.), on December 20, 2002.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of a Special Master's Report and Recommendation issued in In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and ERISA Litig., No. 02-CV-1500 (S.D.N.Y), on August 7, 2007.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of an Order issued in In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and ERISA Litig., No. 02-1500 (S.D.N.Y), dated October 26, 2007.

6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of an Order issued in In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-2202 (D. Kan.), on August 3, 2006.


7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a copy of the firm's resume.

8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a letter to Attorney Jonathan Youngwood dated July 14, 2008.

9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of a letter to the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury dated July 14, 2008.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 15th day of July, 2008.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert A. Izard", is written over a horizontal line. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized 'R' at the beginning.

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

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1                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2                   DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY  
3                   CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-1157

4

5                  IN RE: MERCK LITIGATION                   MOTIONS FOR LEAD  
6   PLAINTIFF AND LEAD  
7   PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL

8

9

10   April 18, 2005  
11   402 E. State Street  
12   Trenton, New Jersey

13

14                  BEFORE: HONORABLE STANLEY R. CHESLER, USDJ

15

16

17                  Pursuant to Section 753 Title 28 United States Code, the  
18                  following transcript is certified to be an accurate record  
19                  as taken stenographically in the above-entitled proceedings.

20

21                  JACQUELINE KASHMER  
22                  Official Court Reporter

23

24

25

26                  JACQUELINE KASHMER, C.S.R., C.R.R.  
27                  OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER  
28                  P. O. Box 12  
29                  Pittstown, NJ 08867  
30                  (609) 656-2595

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Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

1 A P P E A R A N C E S:  
2

3 TRUJILLO, RODRIGUEZ & RICHARDS, LLC  
4 8 Kings Highway West  
Haddonfield, NJ 08033  
5 BY: LISA J. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.,  
For Cimato and Blossom Plaintiffs  
6

7 SCHATZ & NOBEL  
8 20 Church Street  
Hartford, CT 06103  
9 BY: ROBERT A. IZARD, JR., ESQ.,  
WAYNE BOULTON, ESQ.,  
10 For Cimato Plaintiffs

11  
12 KELLER, ROHRBACK, LLP  
13 1201 Third Avenue - Suite 3200  
Seattle, WA 98101  
14 BY: JULI FARRIS DESPER, ESQ.,  
For Cimato Plaintiffs

15  
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17 Newark, NJ 07102  
18 BY: JOSEPH DE PALMA, ESQ.,  
For Mortensen Plaintiffs

19  
20 SCHIFFRIN & BARROWAY, LLP  
21 280 King of Prussia Road  
Radnor, PA 19087  
22 BY: JOSEPH H. MELTZER, ESQ.,  
STUART BERMAN, ESQ.,  
23 For Mortensen Plaintiffs  
24  
25

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

1 A P P E A R A N C E S:

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3

4 JOHNSON & PERKINSON  
5 1690 Williston Road  
P.O. Box 2305  
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BY: JACOB B. PERKINSON, ESQ.,  
6 For Plaintiff Horne

7

8 COHEN, MILSTEIN, HAUSFELD & TOLL, PLLC  
One S. Broad Street - Suite 1850  
9 Philadelphia, PA 19107  
BY: MARC MACHIZ, ESQ.,  
10 For Plaintiff Denise Burtoff

11

12 COHN, LIFLAND, PEARLMAN, HERMANN & KNOFF  
Park 80 Plaza West One  
13 Saddle Brook, NJ 07663  
BY: LEONARD Z. KAUFMANN, ESQ.,  
14 For Ugwuneri Plaintiffs

15

16 SCOTT & SCOTT  
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17 Colchester, CT 06415  
BY: NEIL ROTHSTEIN, ESQ.,  
18 For Ugwuneri Plaintiffs

19

20 CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS  
361 W. Lancaster Avenue  
21 Haverford, PA  
BY: JAMES R. MALONE, JR., ESQ.,  
22 For Ugwuneri Plaintiffs

23

24

25

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A P P E A R A N C E S:

2

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

3 MILBERG, WEISS, BERSHAD & SCHULMAN, LLP  
4 One Pennsylvania Plaza - 49th Floor  
New York, NY 10119  
5 BY: DAVID BROWER, ESQ.,  
RICHARD WEISS, ESQ.,  
6 BRUCE BERNSTEIN, ESQ.,  
For Plaintiffs in the Securities Action  
7

8 LERACH, COUGHLIN, STOIA, GELLER, RUDMAN &  
9 ROBBINS, LLP  
10 401 B Street - Suite 1700  
San Diego, CA 92101  
11 BY: TRAVIS E. DOWNS, III, ESQ.,  
For Proposed Derivative Plaintiffs

12 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE, LLP  
13 Worldwide Plaza  
14 825 Eighth Avenue  
New York, NY 10019-7475  
15 BY: ROBERT BARON, ESQ.,  
For the Defendants  
16

17 HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED  
18 1775 I Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006-2401  
19 BY: WILLIAM STEIN, ESQ.,  
ROBERTA KOSS, ESQ.,  
20 For the Defendants

21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 THE COURT: It's still just barely good morning,  
2 so, good morning, everybody. Enter your appearances,  
3 counsel.

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

1 firm in this case or any another firm is because of what  
2 happened in the Halliburton case, pure and simple. But we  
3 can move forward today. But instead, Mr. Izard is putting a  
4 road block and he is saying no. Why? Why can't we move  
5 forward? That's my argument. And that man, he worked for  
6 Merck. He's the one who has a say here, not me, not them,  
7 not them. That's who we're here for. Thank you, your  
8 Honor.

9 THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything further?

10 MR. IZARD: Only if you have any questions, your  
11 Honor.

12 THE COURT: No, I don't. I'm satisfied based upon  
13 what I've heard that the Cimato plaintiffs' proposal is  
14 indeed one which the Court, in fact, should and must adopt.  
15 I've read your papers with interest. While I read it with  
16 interest, quite frankly, I also read it with distress.

17 Frankly, I look forward to the day when something  
18 vaguely resembling the PSLRA and its selection process can  
19 be enacted to govern lawsuits like this.

20 This Court regards the type of skirmishing, sniping  
21 that are disclosed in these papers to be distasteful. The  
22 Cimato plaintiffs have presented a proposal which makes a  
23 good deal of sense to the Court. From the Court's point of  
24 view, there can only be one objective in selecting lead  
25 plaintiffs and lead counsel and, that is, to come up with a

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision  
1 selection which, in fact, makes certain that a group which  
2 can effectively, intelligently and vigorously represent the  
3 interests of the potential ERISA class members is put  
4 together.

5 This Court could not care less about who's fighting  
6 to get what piece of what pie in terms of attorneys. Quite  
7 frankly, the Court does not regard class action litigation  
8 as being another variant of the attorneys' full employment  
9 act of 2005.

10 Quite frankly, it doesn't matter if some law firms  
11 get a bigger piece of the business and some law firms do  
12 not.

13 In short, the issue is which law firms can make  
14 this lawsuit move most effectively and intelligently for a  
15 plaintiff class.

16 The Court read, for example, the papers from  
17 counsel for plaintiff Horne suggesting that in some manner  
18 or other the law firms in the ERISA class action litigation  
19 have created a closed club and that they are valiantly  
20 trying to break into that club. I applaud them for their  
21 efforts. That's good business development, but from the  
22 Court's point of view, what is intelligent selection of  
23 attorneys is picking a group of attorneys who, in fact, have  
24 substantial experience and heft in this area, and there is  
25 no doubt from looking through the applications of this Court

1 that the Cimato plaintiffs' structure indeed has that.

2 While Schatz & Nobel may not have that many  
Page 23

Transcript of Merck Lead Plaintiff hearing and decision

3 attorneys, there are more than an adequate number of  
4 attorneys in the firms which have agreed to sign on to that  
5 proposal. What is clear is that Schatz & Nobel does have  
6 substantial experience in this area and much more experience  
7 than other contenders.

8 The Court is satisfied that that, coupled with the  
9 experience of the other counsel who have joined that group,  
10 make it far and away the most appropriate proposal that's  
11 been submitted to this Court.

12 The Court is prepared to adopt that proposal,  
13 including the appointment to leadership positions in that  
14 proposal of Scott & Scott and the Johnson & Perkinson firms.  
15 Of course, if either firm does not wish such an appointment,  
16 they can tell me now and I'll be glad to accommodate them.

17 MR. ROTHSTEIN: What's the position, your Honor?

18 THE COURT: The position, as I understand it in  
19 their proposal, is participation in the discovery committee.  
20 Is that correct?

21 MR. IZARD: Yes, your Honor.

22 MR. ROTHSTEIN: We'll accept it.

23 MR. PERKINSON: Your Honor, we're happy to accept  
24 to work with lead counsel. Thank you.

25 THE COURT: Fine. As I said, the proposal

1 submitted by the Cimato group will be adopted by the Court.  
2 The Cimato group lead plaintiff structure will also be  
3 adopted by the Court and the Court will enter an appropriate

APR-04-2003 15:30

ORR & REND, P.A.

683 224 2318 P.02/05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF N.H.  
FILED

Dec 16 4 42 PM '02

DEC 20 2002

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In re Tyco International, Ltd.  
Securities Litigation

MDL DOCKET NO. 02-1335-B  
ALL CASES

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ORDER NUMBER 4

Two competing groups seek appointment as lead plaintiffs and lead counsel for the ERISA class actions consolidated for pretrial purposes under MDL docket no. 02-1335-B.

The "Overby Group" consists of proposed lead plaintiffs Marvin Overby, Edmund Dunne, and Kay Jepson and proposed lead counsel Schatz & Nobel, P.C. and Stull, Stull & Brody. Attorney Robert Izard of the Schatz firm leads the Overby Group and Attorney Kenneth Bouchard of Bouchard and Kleinman, P.A. serves as local counsel.

The "Gordon Group" consists of proposed lead plaintiffs John Gordon, Virginia Konyn, Karl Peterson, Steve Swanson and Gary Johnson, and proposed lead counsel Barrett, Johnston & Parsley and Whatley Drake, LLC. Joe R. Whatley, Jr. and George E. Barrett are the group's principle attorneys, and Mark Mallory of Mallory & Friedman, PLLC serves as local counsel.

Having reviewed the supplemental memoranda and attachments, I am satisfied that both groups of plaintiffs understand the responsibilities that they will assume if they are named lead plaintiffs. Further, neither group appears to be in a better position than the other to represent the interests of the class. I am also satisfied that lead counsel for both groups have the necessary resources, skill and commitment to effectively represent the proposed class. Each of the proposed lead counsel firms has had extensive experience in both leading class actions and prosecuting ERISA claims. Both groups are also served by able local counsel.

In choosing between equally qualified groups, it is not significant that the Overby Group filed its lawsuit first. Nor does it matter that the Gordon Group was the first to file in this district. Instead, two factors lead me to select the Overby Group. First, its complaint is somewhat more comprehensive and detailed than the complaint filed by the Gordon Group. This suggests that the Overby Group is in a marginally better position to provide effective representation to the proposed class because its attorneys already have devoted substantial resources to the investigation of the class's potential claims. Second, counsel for the Overby Group have the advantage of proximity to both this

court and the litigation's likely center of gravity in New York. These two factors are sufficient to tip the balance where, as here, both groups are up to the task of representing the proposed class.

For the reasons set forth in this order, I appoint Overby, Jepson and Dunne to serve as lead plaintiffs and the law firms of Schatz & Nobel, P.C. and Stull, Stull & Brody to serve as co-lead counsel in the ERISA actions. Overby has consented to the transfer of his case to this district for all purposes.

Accordingly, I amend Practice and Procedure Order Number 3 and direct lead counsel to file the consolidated ERISA complaint in Overby v. Tyco International, Ltd. et al., Case No. 02-CV-1357-B.

SO ORDERED.



Paul Barbadoro  
Chief Judge

December 18, 2002

cc: Counsel of Record (Service List Attached)  
Michael Beck, Judicial Panel  
on Multidistrict Litigation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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IN RE AOL TIME WARNER, INC.  
SECURITIES AND "ERISA" LITIGATION

02 Civ. 8853 (SWK)

**REPORT & RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE SPECIAL MASTER**

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**TO: HON. SHIRLEY WOHL KRAM, U.S.D.J.:**

By orders entered October 25 and November 15, 2006, I was appointed Special Master of the Court for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations to the Court upon various applications for fees and expenses filed by attorneys and law firms representing individual claimants or the class in this action. Class counsel requested that the Court enter an award of 20 percent of the total recovery, or \$20 million, plus reimbursement of costs and disbursements. Although counsel seek an award based upon the percentage method, they report accrued fees, based upon their customary hourly billing rates, in the amount of \$9,145,282.10. I respectfully recommend that the applications be granted to the extent of awarding \$17,865,395 in fees and \$267,552.64 in expenses.

**Background of the Action**

This is the second in a trilogy of class actions following in the wake of the merger between two corporate behemoths. Plaintiffs are members of various retirement plans sponsored by America Online Inc. ("AOL"), Time Warner, Inc. ("Time Warner") or their merger-born amalgamation. They sue under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.

\$1001 et seq. Linking the various defendants' accounting irregularities with the over-concentration of plan assets in AOL Time Warner securities, plaintiffs sought to hold them liable for massive losses in the plans' values between 1999 and 2003. Plaintiffs contend that the sponsors and those who directed the plan investments in the relevant time period invested too heavily in the sponsors' own securities, failing to diversify the portfolio and leaving the plans especially vulnerable to loss when an AOL Time Warner accounting scandal became public. According to the Amended Complaint, AOL Time Warner engaged in sham transactions and other artifices designed to create the appearance that they were generating revenue, when in fact they provided only illusory benefits to the company.

Three plan members, Barbara Grant, Rita Roberts and Steven Winfield, commenced the original actions. Those actions were consolidated into a single Amended Complaint, in which three separate law firms acted as co-lead counsel: Stull, Stull & Brody of New York, New York; Schatz & Nobel, P.C. of Hartford, Connecticut; and Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP of Radnor, Pennsylvania.

As is often the case, the Amended Complaint was met with motions to dismiss, filed by two large law firms well experienced in ERISA and class action defense. Defendants were primarily represented by the defense powerhouse of Cravath Swaine & Moore. Counsel thus faced a tough fight, which they no doubt anticipated and were willing to risk from the start.

Most of the Amended Complaint survived the motions to dismiss. The majority of the remaining legal work in the case consisted of the review and coding of documents - some 15 million pages in all according to counsel - and settlement negotiations under the auspices of an earlier Special Master, Paul D. Wachter. Although a class certification motion was filed and summary judgment motions were pending, less time was devoted to those activities than to the discovery-related work.

The mediation conducted by Special Master Wachter was unusually sophisticated. Counsel for each side were challenged to prove their respective positions through evidence, written presentations and oral arguments that spanned multiple days and required elaborate preparation.

The pivotal issues that permeated the litigation were the focal point of the mediation as well. Included among them was the dispute over loss causation, accentuated by the recession and the shattering of the so-called "technology bubble" which coincided with the misdeeds chronicled in the Amended Complaint. The liability of plan fiduciaries and others for concentrating plan assets in company stock was also an unsettled question, as was the standing of holders, rather than sellers, of securities. The morass of documents and complexity of these issues make it hardly surprising that the daily time records reflect more than 28,000 lawyer and paralegal hours.

The case was finally settled at the end of a mediation session with Special Master Wachter on February 22, 2006. The

settlement provides for a \$100 million payment to the plans, to be distributed ultimately to plan beneficiaries. This settlement followed a \$2.5 billion accord, also mediated by Mr. Wachter, in the companion AOL Time Warner securities case nearly a year earlier. (Plan beneficiaries will also share pro rata in the former settlement.) As part of the current settlement, the proposed terms were reviewed and approved by an independent fiduciary, acting pursuant to Department of Labor ERISA settlement regulations.

Counsel sent notice to approximately 65,000 potential beneficiaries. Only four plan members came forward with objections, all through the same attorney in a consolidated filing. In essence, the objectors contend that the settlement arrived on the coattails of the earlier securities settlement, and that the percentage sought by counsel exceeds the "average range of percentage fees." Objection to Class Action Settlement & Request for Attorney's Fees at 5.

On September 27, 2006, the Court approved the settlement in a Memorandum Opinion. In endorsing the settlement, the Court described class counsel as "experienced," "well-informed" and willing to face the many risks associated with this litigation.

I have reviewed the voluminous case file, including the papers prepared and filed by class counsel. Those papers reflect proficient legal advocacy, accurate identification of the issues, timely filings and proper analysis. At the same time, many of the arguments were not new, but were common to many contemporary ERISA

cases, and some emulated the analyses and other work performed in the AOL Time Warner securities case.

In their settlement notice, counsel informed the class of their intention to seek fees up to 25 percent of the recovery amount, plus expenses. Counsel now crystallize their request with an application for 20 percent of the recovery, or \$20 million, plus \$267,552.64 in "out-of-pocket costs and expenses." The cost and expense request, however, was commendably reduced from the original amount of \$327,359.29 after my conference with counsel on May 30, 2007, based on certain issues I raised.

Counsel have submitted their daily time records and summaries of their expenses, broken down by firm. The documents reflect the services performed by each timekeeper, with corresponding dates and duration. These records are intended for use as a potential "cross-check" against their percentage-based fee request.

They distinguish other cases in which the stock price decline was preceded by the issuer's own restatement of financial results. Counsel not only echo the risks present in the prior securities action, such as proving the abstruse web of different artifices used to inflate the company's accounting for advertising revenues, loss causation and a basis for class certification, but additional unsettled issues peculiar to ERISA, such as fiduciary liability, standing to recover as holders of securities and over-concentration of plan assets in company stock. Counsel also cite the absence of a head start from governmental investigations that often spur these private claims.

Counsel heavily emphasize the endorsement of their fee application by an independent fiduciary, Fiduciary Counselors Inc., which also opined favorably upon the settlement. Because federal law prohibits certain settlements of ERISA claims, such independent review is required by an exception for such purpose contained in federal regulations. See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2003-39, 68 Fed. Reg. 75632-01 (Dec. 31, 2003).

In addition to reviewing voluminous applications from counsel and a response from counsel for the objectors, I met with counsel on May 30, 2007 to discuss certain tentative findings, to raise a number of questions and to solicit comment upon the Second Circuit's recent decision in *Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany*, 484 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007).<sup>1</sup> Counsel also presented certain information not readily apparent from their fee submissions. I also invited counsel for the sole objectors, Stephen Tsai, Esq. Mr. Tsai did not attend.

Counsel argued that the ERISA case was riskier than the securities case and that their negotiating position was weakened, rather than bolstered, by the securities settlement. According to counsel, the securities settlement enabled defendants to turn their full attention to the ERISA defense, and the comparatively limited exposure in the ERISA case dampened defendants' incentive to settle.

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<sup>1</sup> This opinion was amended on July 12, 2007 but not in the respects cited here. See 2007 WL 2004106. The official citation from the original decision is utilized for convenience.

Counsel also elaborated on the anatomy of the \$100 million settlement, details of which they were previously reluctant to supply on paper because of the confidential and candid nature of the settlement negotiations and the prospect that these same adversaries would be squaring off in future cases. Keeping this in mind, I will limit my finding to one which notes that, when the mediated negotiations reached the vicinity of \$70 million, a number which the independent fiduciary found to be at the upper range of expectations, counsel pressed on, in the face of stiff resistance from defendants and the pessimism of the Special Master.

Counsel subsequently made further submissions addressing various matters covered at the conference. To their credit, counsel reduced their expense applications by \$59,806.65, in line with certain issues I raised and suggestions I made.

#### **Discussion**

##### **The Approved Methodologies**

This case presents an early opportunity for a district court to apply *Arbor Hill* to an award of attorneys' fees from a common fund. Although *Arbor Hill's* evolutionary holding arose in the context of a statutory fee shifting determination under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1973, its principles resonate throughout the sphere of judicial fee determinations generally. Indeed, its market orientation echoes the Court of Appeals' pronouncement seven years earlier in its reigning common fund guidepost that "market rates, where available, are the ideal proxy

for [class counsel's] compensation." *Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.*, 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000). Counsel acknowledge the relevance of this recent decision and urge that the opinion is consistent with their current application.

*Arbor Hill* is the latest milestone in a cycle of judicial fee jurisprudence that dates back as far as the 19<sup>th</sup> century. See *Trustees v. Greenough*, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).<sup>2</sup> The so-called "common fund doctrine," coupled with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), authorizes the Court to award fees and expenses to class counsel and certain other claimants in a duly certified class action. See *In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation*, 818 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. *Schwartz v. Dean*, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). Based on the notion that incentives and rewards are necessary for those who would take on a legal risk and challenge for the benefit of a wide class, the doctrine awards the successful champions reasonable compensation from the resultant fund.

As the Court of Appeals acknowledged in *Arbor Hill*, the journey from the early days of class actions to the current year has not always been smooth, consistent or, in some cases, clear. The federal courts have shifted back-and-forth between the percentage-of-recovery method and the so-called "lodestar" method, a term now banished by the Court of Appeals to the lexical dustbin

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<sup>2</sup> Interestingly enough, two of the major dictates of *Goldberger*, a preference for "moderation and a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the fund," can be traced back to the Supreme Court's seminal verbiage in *Greenough*. 105 U.S. at 537.

in favor of the "presumptively reasonable fee." Compare, e.g., *Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.*, 48 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), *aff'd sub nom. Singer v. General Motors Corp.*, 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943) with *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 468 (2d Cir. 1974) and with *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 47.

The percentage-of-recovery method popular since the earliest days of common fund litigation evolved in the 1970s into the rate-based lodestar method, see *Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.*, 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973), as the courts perceived that percentage recoveries were too frequently overcompensating counsel at the expense of their class constituents. Under the lodestar procedure, "the district court scrutinizes the fee petition to ascertain the number of hours reasonably billed to the class and then multiplies that figure by an appropriate hourly rate. Once that initial computation has been made, the district court may, in its discretion, increase the lodestar by applying a multiplier based on 'other less objective factors,' such as the risk of the litigation and the performance of the attorneys." *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 47 (citations omitted); see also "*Agent Orange*" *Product Liability Litigation*, 818 F.2d at 222 ("the court may, in its discretion, increase or decrease [the hourly fees] by examining such factors as the quality of counsel's work, the risk of the litigation and the complexity of the issues").

As the broadening scope and complexity of litigation compounded legal hours over the ensuing decades, the lodestar

began drawing fire. Critics have contended that the lodestar created a temptation for lawyers to run up the number of hours for which they could be paid, created an unanticipated disincentive to early settlements and compelled district courts "to engage in a gimlet-eyed review of line-item fee audits." *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 48-49; see also *Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the 3d Cir. Task Force*, 108 F.R.D. 237 (Oct. 8, 1985); *Kirschoff v. Flynn*, 786 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1986). To this day, the lodestar method continues to spark criticism for generating avoidable hours, discouraging early settlement and burdening district judges with tedious audits of time records. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 48-49; Alan Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, *Awarding Attorneys Fees & Managing Fee Litigation* at 73-74 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2d ed. 2005).

It did not take long for the percentage method to regain its place in fee jurisprudence. Some circuits began mandating its use, e.g., *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993), while others, including the Second Circuit, retained the lodestar as an alternative. See *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50; *In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation*, 19 F.3d 1291 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993).

Regardless of the method used, the fee determination process represents a departure from the norms of the justice system. In typical party-against-party litigation, each side pays its own fees. See *Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y*, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). In statutory fee-shifting cases, such as

*Arbor Hill*, defendants have every incentive to minimize their fee exposure. Even in this case, aside from the frequency with which class actions end in settlement, see Decl. of Michael J. Klein, Jul. 18, 2006, Ex. B; Janet Cooper Alexander, *Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions*, 43 Stanford L. Rev. 497, 578 (1991), neither side could rule out an eventual award through statutory fee-shifting until the settlement was reached. See 29 U.S.C. §1132(g) (ERISA fee-shifting statute).

By contrast, in a common fund case, the defendants, having settled by creating a finite monetary pool in exchange for a release, have little interest in the division of the spoils. Individual class members, whose numbers are scattered and who often lack a singular interest sufficient to prompt intervention, rarely object. See Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, *Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts* at 76 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1996). While the absence of dissent is a factor that the courts must consider, it is far from decisive. See *In re Cendant Corp. Litig.*, 264 F.3d 201, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2001) ("acquiescence [which is the most that a failure to object shows] is not the same thing as 'prior approval'") (ellipse in original).

Thus, the Court must enter the fray as a guardian of the class interests and to harmonize the tension between the remunerative demands of counsel and maximizing the recoveries of individual claimants. See *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 52; see

*generally Court Awarded Attorney Fees*, 108 F.R.D. 237. Regardless of the method used, "a fee award should be assessed based on scrutiny of the unique circumstances of each case and 'a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the fund.'" *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 53, quoting *Grinnell*, 495 F.2d at 469. Regardless of whether the court in a case of this nature would ultimately engage in statutory fee shifting, hourly fee analysis or a percentage approach, it is as true for the plaintiffs in this case as it was in *Arbor Hill* that they had "little incentive to negotiate a rate structure with [their] attorney prior to the litigation; the district court must act later to ensure that the attorney does not recoup fees that the market would not otherwise bear." 484 F.2d at 164.

#### **The Two Approaches**

The Second Circuit has provided detailed guidance on the implementation of the two permissible methods, onto which it has superimposed the requirements expressed in *Arbor Hill*. There is no reason to abjure *Arbor Hill's* market focus simply because this is a common fund case. If nothing else, it informs the hourly rate "cross-check," and, as counsel have argued, a percentage recovery may well be the market model in ERISA class actions.

The Court of Appeals has left broad discretion to the district courts in the choice between the lodestar and percentage processes. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50; *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc.*, 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. *Leonardo's Pizza by the Slice, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores*,

*Inc.*, 544 U.S. 1044 (2005).

Despite having this option, every significant Southern District opinion facing the issue since Goldberger has embraced the percentage approach, without much case-specific analysis of the choice. *Banyai v. Mazur*, 00 Civ. 9806 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (8.45 percent fee award for \$40 million settlement); *In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Securities & "ERISA" Litig.*, 2006 WL 3057232 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006); *Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P.*, 2006 WL 290477 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006); *In re Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litigation*, 2005 WL 3116188 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005); *Hicks v. Stanley*, 2005 WL 2757792 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005); *In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation*, 388 F. Supp.2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *FTR ex rel. Cel-Sci Co v. Adv. Fund II Ltd.*, 2005 WL 2234039 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2005); *Spann v. AOL Time Warner Inc.*, 2005 WL 1330937 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 7, 2005); *In re Elan Securities Litig.*, 385 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litigation*, 361 F. Supp.2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist*, 230 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); *In re Alloy, Inc. Securities Litigation*, 2004 WL 2750089, \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004); *In re Global Crossing Securities & ERISA Litigation*, 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); *In re Interpublic Sec. Litig.*, 2004 WL 2397190 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004); *In re AMF Bowling*, 334 F. Supp.2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); *Klein ex rel. SICOR, Inc. v. Salvi*, 2004 WL 596109 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004); *In re Independent Energy*

*Holdings PLC*, 2003 WL 22244676 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2003); *In re Lloyd's American Trust Fund Litigation*, 2002 WL 31663577 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002); *Baffa v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Co.*, 2002 WL 1315603 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 17, 2002); *In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mutual Fund Litig.*, 2001 WL 709262 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 22, 2001); *In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc.*, 127 F. Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001); *Varljen v. H.J. Meyers & Co., Inc.*, 2000 WL 1683656 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000). Each of these decisions seems to have been guided mainly by the generic simplicity of a percentage selection, in contrast to the agonizing calculation of the lodestar.

Similarly, a review of ERISA class action monetary settlements both inside and outside this district shows a uniform application of the percentage method. See Decl. of Michael J. Klein, Jul. 18, 2006, Ex. B.

It would be an understatement to say that the lodestar has become the exception, as opposed to the rule, in large class action recoveries. There is little reason to deviate from the rule in this case. Although I have cross-checked the result against counsel's hourly time records, that process required less mathematical precision when used for that purpose, rather than as the basic meter for fee determination. The percentage method has therefore saved time and left less room for subjective challenges over usefulness and efficiency of any particular hour.

To be sure, some justification could be found for use of the presumptively reasonable fee method here. Though its application

entails time, precision and no shortage of tedium, the hourly fee method is arguably a more objective measure. See *Grinnell*, 495 F.2d at 470-71 (only the lodestar method can "claim objectivity"); see also *In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec. Litig.*, 966 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir. 1992) (fee computed under lodestar method is "strongly presumed to be reasonable"). That advantage is partially lost, however, when, as here, adjustments are or should be made to the hours claimed or the hourly fee requested.

And if a major goal of the percentage method is to avoid an unnecessary run-up of lawyer hours or a roadblock to early settlement, the percentage method is not necessarily a panacea in a regime where the court uses its discretion at the end of the case to determine not only the amount of fees, but the method used to calculate them. Counsel do not usually know until the case is over which method of compensation will obtain. Probability, not certainty, of a percentage recovery is arguably enough to accomplish the objectives of deterring unnecessary hours and fostering early settlement.

The most significant reason for pause in this case is its underlying nature and clientele. This is an ERISA case. The beneficiaries are not shareholders, but, rather, an estimated 65,000 individual current or former employees of AOL Time Warner or related entities. They undoubtedly worked at many diverse levels, from the mail room to the executive suite.

Unlike the more common shareholder cases, the landscape was

not dominated by sophisticated institutional investors whose decisions were fully volitional, unshackled from employee loyalty or the influence of sponsor steering. As class counsel argued in the underlying action, the class members here were constrained to some degree in their abilities to opt out of these employer-sponsored investment vehicles or to influence the choice of plan holdings.

Unsurprisingly, there is no evidence of a fee agreement between counsel and the lead plaintiffs. Even if there were, it is doubtful that these plaintiffs would have the sophistication or the clout of the large institutional holders in securities actions which engage in hard bargaining with lead counsel over retainer terms. Under the current circumstances, a court works off of a cleaner slate and must lend especial scrutiny to counsel's fee requests.

In addition, ERISA has its own statutory fee-shifting authority. 29 U.S.C. §1132(g). It is well established that, under this provision, fees would be assessed against the defendant on the basis of an hourly rate, rather than a percentage. See *McDonald ex rel Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund*, 450 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2006).

The existence of Section 1132(g) does not, however, preclude the use of the common fund doctrine to award fees from the recovered fund under the percentage method. Various courts have addressed this precise issue, upholding the use of the percentage method in common fund ERISA cases. See, e.g., *Florin v.*

*Nationsbank of Georgia, N.A.*, 34 F.3d 560 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); *In re Global Crossing Securities and ERISA Litig.*, 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Nevertheless, the class characteristics here – a multitude of individuals with limited choice and bargaining power – conjoin with the hourly rate regime of Section 1132(g) to warrant, at a minimum, a more thorough cross-check against a percentage award than might ordinarily be the case.

**Application of These Principles**

Ultimately, as Goldberger instructs us, the objective is a reasonable fee, which may be established by either the hourly fee or percentage method. Arbor Hill reinforces the market driven approach toward assessment of legal fees. The confluence of these principles commends use of the percentage approach under the circumstances of this case.

As in virtually any case, this method offers simplicity. The percentage method reduces, though it does not eliminate, an expensive and mind-numbing line-by-line review of counsel's bills, thereby freeing judicial resources and allowing class and claimants to be paid, and the case to be closed, more quickly. It also mimics the contingent fee system that has developed in this country for cases of significant risk or of plaintiffs who are unwilling or unable to afford the cost prior to conclusion.

The class here consisted of individual employees or retirees, none of whom likely could have afforded counsel's total hourly price tag of over \$9 million during the course of the litigation. Paying an hourly rate was not a realistic option.

On the other hand, ERISA's fee-shifting provision, 29 U.S.C. §1132(g), could have enabled counsel to seek fees from the offending defendants. Fee-shifting statutes such as Section 1132 serve the same vindictory function as the common fund doctrine, without invading the fund recovered for the plaintiff class.<sup>3</sup> The question remains whether top caliber counsel would be lured by such an arrangement, for which little precedent is found in these stock-concentration cases. In this particular marketplace, such an arrangement would be uncommon, if not unprecedented.

And although this action was filed under ERISA, rather than the securities laws, the markets for legal services are sufficiently alike that guidance can be drawn from the more mature securities litigation arena. There, as noted, recent cases show an overwhelming preference for the percentage award. In a growing number of such cases, sophisticated lead plaintiffs, such as investment funds, have entered into retainer agreements based on percentages.

As the Court of Appeals begrudgingly but realistically acknowledged, the courts themselves have become factors in this marketplace. *Arbor Hill*, 484 F.3d at 164 ("the district court (unfortunately) bears the burden of disciplining the market, stepping into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case

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<sup>3</sup> As a practical matter, counsel fees could nevertheless enter into the settlement negotiations, as defendants would likely factor such fees into their aggregate cost of settlement, even if the fees were paid to the lawyers directly rather than the client class.

effectively"). The near uniformity with which the courts in this district and elsewhere of late have applied the percentage method is testament to its dominance.

This settlement also consisted entirely of monetary compensation. It did not include coupons, injunctive relief or other non-monetary elements of ambiguous valuation, which could undermine the reliability of a percentage analysis. *Compare, e.g., Shaw v. Toshiba America Information Systems*, 91 F. Supp.2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000).

In addition, the presumptively reasonable fee method works most efficiently where only minimal adjustment is required for the time spent and the hourly billing rates. Here, a number of adjustments have been made to the hourly time charges computed by counsel. The risks associated with the case at its outset further support a percentage determination. Even if an hourly-based fee were awarded, it would warrant some measure of enhancement to account for the risk and quality of the service. Hence, the selection of a presumptively reasonable fee would involve only modestly more precision than choosing a percentage.

This becomes the decisive factor in support of the percentage method here. A "presumptively reasonable fee" analysis would itself in this case require some enhancement to compensate counsel for the risks they undertook and the manner in which they achieved their sizable recovery. The injection of this element of subjectivity into the fee process weakens the rationale for eschewing a percentage award for lack of

objectivity.

As this Circuit's law requires, I have cross-checked my tentative percentage calculation against the "presumptively reasonable fee." See *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.3d at 123; *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50. Indeed, given the nature of the beneficiaries in this case, I have applied a more thorough cross-check than might otherwise be the case.

**The Percentage of the Recovery**

This Circuit has rejected a "benchmark" recovery percentage for class action counsel. Unlike some other circuits, which have embraced generically applicable percentages, often as high as 25 percent, see, e.g., *Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit requires a searching analysis based upon the circumstances of each case. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 53.

The traditional factors for computing common fund attorneys' fees thus remain relevant. In *Goldberger*, the Court defined those elements as (1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations. *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.3d at 121 (citing *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 50); see also *Matter of Freeman*, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974) (adopting similar analyses under state law).

*Goldberger* emphasizes two other important points, namely that "moderation" is the touchstone and that the district courts

should strive to replicate market compensation. 209 F.3d at 52 ("market rates, where available, are the ideal proxy for [class counsel's] compensation"). At the same time, the Second Circuit recognizes that, in this type of case, where the fee is set retrospectively without the challenge of a traditional adversary, we "cannot know precisely what fees common fund plaintiffs in an efficient market for legal services would agree to, given an understanding of the particular case and the ability to engage in collective arm's-length negotiation with counsel." *Id.* Accordingly, the Court of Appeals requires that a "searching assessment" be performed by the district court in each case based upon the circumstances of that case. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 52.

*Arbor Hill* now adds, at least for the purpose of determining the presumptively reasonable fee, a set of additional considerations. In addition to assessing the factors set forth in *Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.*, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), the court

should also bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case.

484 F.2d at 169.

*Arbor Hill* weaves into the assessment the reality that the courts play an important role in establishing market compensation in class action cases. This does not necessarily represent a

move toward a "benchmark," but does commend some comparison with other cases in which the courts, sometimes with help from sophisticated lead plaintiffs, have influenced this market.

The court can best do justice to the market here by fusing the *ex ante* approaches taken in retainer agreements and a number of judicial innovations, with more traditional *ex post* class action fee awards. In their struggle to introduce market competition into the selection and compensation of class counsel, the courts have experimented with concepts ranging from competitive bidding to sealed outcome predictions. See, e.g., *In Re HPL Technologies, Inc. Securities Litig.*, 366 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Data are available from studies of cases in which "auctions" were conducted for the selection of class counsel. See Laural L. Looper & Marie Leary, *Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study* (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2001), reprinted at 209 F.R.D. 519 (2002).<sup>4</sup> The study concluded that, in such cases, the fee percentages tended to be lower than those awarded retrospectively by the courts:

Attorneys' fees were generally less than the reported percentages in other class actions in the respective circuits. The majority of fee awards was less than 9% (may or may not include expenses) of the total recovery and ranged from a low of approximately 5% in *In*

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<sup>4</sup> Although the auction approach has fallen into disfavor, e.g., *In re Cendant Corp. Litig.*, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. *Mark v. Calif. Pub. Employees' Retirement System*, 535 U.S. 929 (2002), there is no reason to doubt the data generated in those cases. While it is true that fee auctions drew theoretical criticism for downplaying the quality element in counsel selection, counsel ultimately selected in various cases, including *Cendant*, were renowned practitioners in the field.

*re Auction Houses* to a high of 22.5% in *In re Oracle*.

Class counsel herein, by contrast, cite a "benchmark range" of 20 percent to 33  $\frac{1}{3}$  percent, a spread considerably higher than that found in the auction study. Mem. of Law in Support of Class Counsel's Motion at 1.

One popular innovation, which has garnered a following in lead plaintiff retainer agreements, is the use of tiered percentage structures, which depend upon the size of the recovery and the stage at which it was achieved. One such arrangement was made by lead counsel and adopted by the court in *WorldCom*.<sup>5</sup> The potentials ranged on a decreasing basis from 4 to 12 percent. Judge Cote ultimately approved counsel's request for fees totaling \$336.1 million, or 5.5 percent of the total recovery. On the grid, a figure of 12 percent would apply to a settlement in the range here.

A negotiated retainer arrangement also existed in *Cendant Corp. Litig.*, 264 F.3d 201.<sup>6</sup> There, two leading class action firms agreed to a fee scale, for settlement during discovery, of 17.5 percent for a recovery up to \$100 million; 10 percent between \$100 and \$300 million; 7.5 percent between \$300 and \$500 million; and 5 percent above \$500 million.

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<sup>5</sup> The complete retainer agreement was filed with the *WorldCom* court as part of counsel's fee application and is available at <http://www.worldcomlitigation.com/courtdox/retainer.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> The case was remanded because, *inter alia*, counsel had not obtained lead plaintiff's prior review of their fee application, as required by the retainer letter. But this does not affect the letter's vitality as a heuristic example of market-based bargaining.

Although two samples are no talismans, and the Second Circuit has rejected the benchmark approach in any event, the *WorldCom* and *Cendant* retainer letters furnish informative market-based guidance. And they do so not only with actual bargained-for percentages, but also with sliding scales based on both the magnitude and juncture of the recovery.

Finding a common thread in judicial fee determinations is a less scrutable undertaking. Some judicial decisions have followed the trend in retainer letters, tapering the fee percentages as the amounts of recovery increase. See, e.g., *Prudential*, 148 F.3d at 340. The agreements also incorporated negotiated percentages noticeably lower than those which class counsel herein cite as prevailing in megafund cases. These agreements, and the Federal Judicial Center study, provide evidence that the percentages awarded retrospectively by various courts tend to exceed those that would be generated through give-and-take bargaining in the commercial marketplace. See also *In re Cabletron Systems Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 239 F.R.D. 30 (D.N.H. 2006) (surveying various cases and commentaries awarding percentages and concluding that bargaining and bidding generally lead to lower awards).

A lesser number of tiered cases have increased the percentages as the recovery climbed, on a theory of diminishing returns which assumes counsel's efforts will slacken once they have reached a point of marginal satisfaction. See John C. Coffee, Jr., *Litigation Governance: A Gentle Critique of the*

*Third Circuit Task Force Rept.*, 74 Temple L. Rev. 805, 809 n. 16 (2001) (citing two cases in which fee percentages increased with the size of the award); see also *In re AT&T Corp.*, 455 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2006); *In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Securities & "ERISA" Litig.*, 2006 WL 3057232.

Even the source cited by counsel here, a compendium of 76 ERISA cases compiled by Fiduciary Counselors Inc., the independent fiduciary in this case, shows no common thread from which to derive a percentage. The percentages range from a low of 2.8 to a high of 43.5, and the variances cannot always be explained by the size of the settlement or the nature or duration of the case. See Decl. of Michael J. Klein, Jul. 18, 2006, Ex. B. Recently awarded fee percentages in large ERISA settlements in this district have ranged from 18 percent in *WorldCom*, 59 Fed. R. Serv.3d 1170 (2004), to 15 percent in *Global Crossing*, 225 F.R.D. at 469, to 8.45 percent in *Banyai*. No single precedent provides a template from which the fee here can be determined.

#### **The Goldberger Factors**

##### **(1) The Time And Labor Expended By Counsel.**

Counsel report spending in the aggregate 28,354 hours on this litigation, including paralegal time. This equated to fees of \$9,145,282.10. Of that amount, attorney time comprised 28,078 hours, with corresponding fees of \$9,068,740.85.

This case required enormous manpower. Most of the hours were dominated by associates and paralegals, who reviewed millions of documents to extract evidence. This is a necessary undertaking in

a case of this genre. Partner hours, in significant part, were devoted to preparation of the consolidated complaint, negotiations, mediation with the Special Master, settlement implementation and supervision.

Motions were filed for dismissal and for summary judgment. Some of the issues were familiar ones, such as the standards for alleging securities fraud and accounting irregularities. Others were less common, including the ERISA issues of concentration in the sponsor's securities and holder standing. Loss causation was a challenging and partially unsettled issue.

Though over 28,000 hours were expended overall, the aggregate is well within bounds for a massive case of this nature. The case was handled with relative efficiency. Although the hourly cross-check suggests a reduction of 1,483 hours and a corresponding \$481,795.50 in the hourly fees submitted, these adjustments, representing 5.2 percent of the hours, are modest in comparison with similarly sized cases. In the securities case, for example, the Court adopted a recommendation cross-checked against an hourly reduction of 14.7 percent. The relatively small adjustment here is notable considering that large cases inherently tend to produce at least some inefficiencies, and that it is easier to manage a complex case in hindsight than in the midst of high-pressure litigation.

#### **(2) The Magnitude and Complexities of the Litigation.**

This litigation was large and complex. The labyrinthian regulatory scheme of ERISA intersected with alleged securities

infractions to sculpt a legal and accounting maze. Changes in the legal landscape occurred during the pendency of the action, including a Supreme Court ruling on loss causation that threw the outcome into still further doubt. See *Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo*, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005); *Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.*, 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 421 (2005).

Counsel and paraprofessionals reviewed and analyzed millions of documents, employing such innovative tools as an electronic data repository. They defended or conducted several depositions, although most of the deposition work was obviated by the settlement.

The recovery was substantial. The \$100 million payable by defendants represents one of the highest ERISA recoveries in history. But size alone is not the determinant. “[A] large settlement can as much reflect the number of potential class members or the scope of the defendant’s past acts as it can indicate the prestige, skill, and vigor of the class’s counsel.” *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 560 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1977). The magnitude of this settlement is in significant part attributable to the size of the class and the ERISA-regulated fund at issue.

Other than some additional cost of identifying and notifying class members, it is difficult to discern much additional complexity of the work or risk stemming from the class size. By the same token, the size of the class and the attendant risk to the defendants gave the defendants inherent incentive to settle

the action.

**(3) The Risk of the Litigation.**

Risk has been described by some authorities as the preeminent factor in determining either a percentage or a lodestar multiplier. See *Agent Orange*, 818 F.2d at 236.

Counsel argue that this case "entail[ed] a greater financial risk than most." Mem. of Law in Support of Class Counsel's Motion at 23. They point in particular to "a high risk that they would be unable to establish liability, certify the class and establish damages at trial." They further cite anticipated "millions of dollars in costs just to complete thorough discovery, with significant additional outlays should it be necessary to go to trial." *Id.* Finally, counsel point to the number of unsettled factual and legal issues that confronted them.

Many of these risks are inherent in any class action. Thus, the risks existed but for the most part were hardly unique. Plaintiffs also cite a number of cases for the proposition that the "state of the law in ERISA company stock cases is not mature." *Id.* While there has been considerable development of the learning curve with ERISA cases, particularly over the past few years, counsel's statement is accurate as of the date this action was filed. Even so, no ERISA case of this type has ever gone to trial. As with most large class actions, ERISA stock concentration cases tend to settle. Neither side in a large ERISA case seems inclined to take the risk, or incur or accrue

the burden or expense, of a trial. See Report of the Independent Fiduciary for the Proposed Settlement in the AOL Time Warner ERISA Litigation (Jun. 29, 2006) at 17.

Given this consideration, and the high likelihood that any judgment against the particular defendants here would be collectible, the risk in this case, though undeniably present, should not be overstated. There is no suggestion that the company or any of the individual defendants, a virtual *Who's Who* of civic and financial leaders, were impecunious. During the pendency of this litigation, the defendants in the parallel securities case withheld a \$2.5 billion settlement, with no impact on the company's viability.

Risks also run both ways. The absence of any trials of these ERISA cases reflects the uncertainties faced by defendants as well as plaintiffs, creating powerful incentives to settle on both sides. Cases of this magnitude frequently end in settlement because neither side wants to assume the ultimate risk of a jury verdict or summary judgment. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 43 Stanford L. Rev. at 578. This risk is an issue not only for the immediate defendants, but globally for director and officer insurers, for whom a losing precedent could have cataclysmic impact.

The settlement of the AOL Time Warner securities case cuts both ways in evaluating the risk here. Counsel argued at our conference that the settlement undercut their position, to the degree that defendants were prepared to turn their formidable

defensive firepower against this case alone. On the other hand, the reality that the likely stakes in this case were lower, and the same Special Master was engaged in similar settlement procedures, decreased the risk that the class and counsel would leave empty-handed. Leading ERISA cases have tended to settle soon after compromise of parallel securities litigation. The Global Crossing, Enron and Bristol-Myers Squibb ERISA cases, for example, each settled soon after settlement of the securities actions. Overall, class counsel here faced higher-than-average risk on the merits, lower-than-average risk of facing trial and substantially lower-than-average risk of non-collection.

**(4) The Quality of Representation.**

Counsel take justifiable pride in their accomplishments. The quality of their filings was impressive. Counsel defeated well developed motions to dismiss, filed by skilled and renowned defense lawyers. Even more importantly, they used the mediation process to persuade reluctant and determined defendants to part with settlement dollars well above those expected.

The service was praiseworthy in all respects. That being said, quality performance does not always justify an outlying fee. Counsel were selected herein on the basis of their quality, formidability and track record of superior results. Their hourly billing rates, which stand well above the median, reflect an inherent and anticipated quality factor. See Alba Conte and Herbert B. Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* §14:6 (Thomson-West, 4th ed. 2002) ("market rate for legal fees depends in part on the

risk of nonpayment a firm agrees to bear, in part on the quality of its performance, in part on the amount of work necessary to resolve the litigation, and in part on the stakes of the case").

Counsel also benefited to a degree from work performed by others. Though counsel parlayed information into successful advocacy, the transactions giving rise to the suit were first exposed by reports in the media, and the ensuing accounting analysis was in significant part developed in the securities case and by expert consultants. The time records reflect regular consultation with the attorneys prosecuting the more advanced securities case.<sup>7</sup>

Parallel government investigations were also undertaken. AOL was cited by the SEC for limited violations in 2000 and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia on December 14, 2004. Several peripheral figures were indicted, various AOL executives implicated in the class action lost their jobs and the company restated its accounting during the pendency of the action.

**(5) The Requested Fee in Relation to the Settlement.**

As noted, these blockbuster cases generally entail lower fee percentages than those seen in smaller cases, to avoid delivering a windfall to the attorneys because of the size of the class or the recovery. See *Prudential*, 148 F.3d at 340.

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<sup>7</sup> Although the time records reveal that most of the relationship among the plaintiffs' lawyers in the two cases was marked by cooperation, there was friction at the time of the securities settlement over the scope of the releases, which counsel here viewed as a risk to their case.

This factor is inherently considered in the selection of the appropriate percentage. Here, the percentage falls well within the range of similar cases. An important consideration is the extra mile traveled by counsel to obtain a \$100 million settlement for the class, an amount substantially above what experts considered fair and what seemed achievable under the circumstances.

**(6) Public Policy Considerations.**

In evaluating the public policy ramifications of a fee award, the need to encourage counsel to accept worthy engagements must be reconciled with capping compensation at reasonable levels. See *In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig.*, 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd sub nom. *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.3d 96. A large award here does not offend public policy. The result was superlative. Unlike other cases where the class award consisted significantly of injunctive relief, stock, price rollbacks or hard-to-value coupons, the class will receive its entire \$100 million award in cash replenishment of the plans.

The award here harmonizes the goals of encouraging the bar to accept future assignments, deterring errant plan sponsors and advisors and avoiding inequitable dilution of the class members' recovery. An award in the vicinity of that here would fall just barely outside the prevailing range cited by the objectors. See Objection to Class Settlement & Request for Attorney's Fees at 4 (contending that "[p]ercentage fees post-Goldberger have ranged from 4% to 16%").

#### The Arbor Hill Factors

Although *Arbor Hill's* place in the selection of common fund fee percentages is not yet clear, this recent Court of Appeals opinion is relevant, at the very least in connection with the cross-check. Its reinforcement of the market-based approach commended in *Goldberger* is also instructional, regardless of the method used to fix the fee.

*Arbor Hill* directs the district courts to consider the twelve factors enumerated in *Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express*, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Most of those criteria literally or conceptually overlap the six factors set forth in *Goldberger*. The *Johnson* elements include:

- (1) the time and labor required;
- (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
- (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
- (5) the customary fee;
- (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
- (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
- (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
- (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
- (10) the "undesirability" of the case;
- (11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (12) awards in similar cases.

Of those elements, only factors 4, 7, 10 and 11 are not subsumed within the preceding Goldberger analysis. Item 11, however, is irrelevant to this situation.

Item 4 is not covered in counsel's submission, understandably because *Arbor Hill* was not issued until after their filings. A review of various class action cases around the country, however, indicates that all three firms were engaged in other, substantial matters. See also Mem. of Law in Support of Class Counsel's Motion at 33-35. While the hours devoted to this case were extensive, it does not appear that a majority of any firm's time was devoted to this case at the expense of others. And the burden was shared among three firms.

As to factor 7, this case was not marked by nominal or absentee clients. The lead plaintiffs in this case contributed their own time and effort and were involved in certain phases of the work. They did not, however, impose any particular time limitations that are reflected in counsel's submissions. The only time constraints were those fixed by court scheduling. Such limitations were no more severe than those attending typical cases of this nature and the Special Master accommodated counsel's schedules in his performance of the mediation.

This case was not "undesirable," the tenth factor enumerated in *Johnson*. True enough, the competition for the lead counsel role was not as intense as in the companion securities case, *Cendant* or a number of others. Nevertheless, three prominent class action firms eagerly sought the engagement and ultimately

worked together to achieve this recovery.

Finally, Arbor Hill encourages the reviewing court to evaluate non-monetary benefits accruing to counsel, such as reputational interests. In this case and others, counsel vying for class action appointments regularly cite their accomplishments in similar matters. There is little doubt that the \$100 million recovered here, and the commendations flowing from the Court's approval of the settlement and this Report, will be highlighted by counsel in their future applications and bolster their opportunities for new engagements.

#### **Fee Recommendation**

Although the comparative data supplied by counsel are helpful in performing the "searching assessment" of the fee application, the fee must ultimately be based upon a thorough evaluation of the circumstances of this case:

In reviewing an attorneys' fees award in a class action settlement, a district court should consider all factors that are useful and relevant with respect to the particular facts of the case. The factors should not be applied formulaically; in cases involving extremely large settlement awards, district courts may give some factors less weight than others in evaluating a fee award. It is important in all cases that the district court robustly engages in assessments of the fee award reasonableness factors with close scrutiny of fee arrangements in class action settlements.

*Current Decisions Survey*, 27 Class Action Rep. 34 (2006).

To inject a measure of science into the fee-setting process here, I have focused on three discernible phases present in this litigation. These segments are derived from a review of the

court filings, counsel's time records, the conference we conducted and the conclusions of the independent fiduciary.

The first phase consisted of the pre-mediation period, in which counsel absorbed the greatest risk: a shutout. The second phase emerged during the mediation process, when offers appeared on the table and counsel were better assured of a settlement at some level that would provide them with a reasonable return on their efforts. The third phase consisted of the period, during the mediation, in which counsel tenaciously spurned a settlement that was reasonable and potentially approvable, holding out for the standout recovery that was ultimately attained.

Economic rationality suggests that counsel's risk began to subside when settlement offers materialized that would have permitted counsel to recover a fee in the vicinity of their regular hourly rates. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., *Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions*, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 681, n. 35 (1986). That is because such rates are presumptively set at a level at or above a threshold of profitability.

To recover their hourly fees at their requested allowance of 20 percent of the total recovery, counsel would have required a recovery of \$43,317,433. This calculation results from dividing the adjusted hourly claim of \$8,663,486.60 by the figure of 20 percent. Because 20 percent falls within the range awarded in eight-figure ERISA recoveries, see Decl. of Michael J. Klein,

Jul. 18, 2006, Ex. B, this is a fair percentage to award for this tranche.

The second tier is tied to the recovery between \$43,317,433 and an expectable result of \$70,000,000. Counsel themselves pointed to their recovery above \$70 million as their most difficult and noteworthy feat. Thus, the intermediate tier of \$26,682,567 reflects both the recovery of counsel's base profit - as measured by their own hourly rates - and a plateau at which neither extraordinary skills nor results resounded. Although this result should not be gainsaid, there is little reason for a premium on a result that was within the realm of expectation from well credentialed lawyers. A lower percentage is also consistent with the majority of fee agreements and auction awards, and a number of decisions, that taper percentages downward as the recovery amounts increase. And it follows a nascent downward trend in percentages generally. See Wayne Schneider, *Courts Don't Have to Award Excessive Fees to Incentivize Class Counsel in Federal Securities Class Actions*, 20 NAPPA Report 8, 8-9 (May 2006). Accordingly, I am recommending a 12 percent award for this second layer of recovery, or \$3,201,908.

The third and final tier of \$30 million, on the other hand, stands out as some of the hardest work and most outstanding results. Here is where counsel exceeded the expectations of the independent fiduciary and stretched the defendants' settlement tolerances beyond their limits. I confirmed this conclusion with Nell Hennessy, President and CEO of the independent fiduciary.

See also Fiduciary Counselors Inc., Report of the Independent Fiduciary. Awarding 20 percent for this tranche (\$6 million) will compensate counsel for their tenacity and provide incentives for future counsel to continue to press class recoveries, even past the point of diminishing returns. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 74 Temple L. Rev. at 809 n. 16; see also *In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig.*, 197 F.R.D. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

Accordingly, the total amount of this fee recommendation is \$17,865,395, or approximately 17.9 percent of the total recovery. The proposed fee percentage is applied to the gross recovery amount, not the net after disbursements. See *Newberg*, §14:6 ("most courts seem to apply the percentage of recovery methodology to the gross settlement fund").

While there is an element of arbitrariness in any percentage fee award, this recommendation measures the accomplishments of counsel in distinct phases. It harmonizes diverse and sometimes conflicting considerations: compensation for risk and quality, avoidance of overcompensation for expected performance, incentives to maximize the class recovery, and consistency with awards in similar cases.

It also honors the market. See *Arbor Hill*, 484 F.3d at 171. A lawyer choosing between a risky contingent fee assignment and one that guarantees a return of his or her hourly rate would negotiate for a higher premium for the riskiest phase. By the same token, the thrifty client postulated in *Arbor Hill* would no doubt resist a bonus for an expectable result. "By asking what a

reasonable, paying client would do, a district court best approximates the workings of today's market for legal services." *Id.* And, further, a success fee for a particularly good result is recognized as a legitimate marketplace incentive. See *Arkin Kaplan LLP v. Jones*, \_\_\_ A.D.3d \_\_\_, \_\_\_ N.Y.S.2d \_\_\_, 2007 WL 2050946 (1st Dept. Jul. 19, 2007).

In addition, this fee results in an average hourly billing rate for all timekeepers - attorneys and paralegals - of \$630.08, yielding a multiplier of 2.06 over regular hourly rates. This multiplier would peg the hourly rates at \$1,380 for the highest billing partner<sup>8</sup> and \$433 for the lowest billing associate. Given that some top lawyers already command regular hourly rates in excess of \$1,000, see *Hourly Billing Rates Continue to Rise*, National L. J. (Dec. 12, 2005), the rates, with a multiplier for risk and quality, though high, are within bounds. See Altman Weil, *Survey of Law Firm Economics* (Altman Weil Publications Inc. 2005) at 85. There is no out-of district rate issue here, as the prevailing rates in counsel's three locations, Hartford, Philadelphia and New York, are not materially dissimilar. *Id.* at 89, 91 (indicating average partner rates in Pennsylvania only \$5 per hour lower than in New York and in Connecticut actually higher per hour than in New York). The 2.06 multiplier is nearly identical to the 2.19 multiplier that counsel touted as appropriate for this case.

As a further and related matter, the recommendation comports

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<sup>8</sup> This disregards 15 minutes billed by one partner at \$745 per hour.

with an hourly fee cross-check. See pp. 42-50, *infra*. The award, based on counsel's unadjusted recordings, yields a 1.95 multiple. Based upon the adjustment for excess time, the multiple becomes, as noted, 2.06.

The award is modestly less than the amount requested by class counsel, an amount with which the independent fiduciary was satisfied. However, the award applies counsel's requested percentage to the phases of the case where it is most applicable, namely the initial stages where there was heightened risk of non-recovery, and the final stages in which counsel deserve a special reward for their tenacity.

The award steers clear of a benchmark, *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 51, but still falls within the overall contemporary range. It gives recognition to an emerging trend toward smaller class action fee percentages, see Wayne Schneider, 20 NAPPA Report at 8-9, and to consideration of *Arbor Hill's* hypothesized thrifty client. In addition, because this case falls under ERISA with its unique class of beneficiaries, and at least some possibility at the outset that counsel would be compensated on an hourly basis under Section 1132(g), it is not unfair to temper counsel's fee proposal.

This award considers, but is not dictated by, fees authorized in other cases. Indeed, the wide variance among class action awards highlights the impracticality of basing awards on predecessor cases.

Counsel underscore the size of their recovery, in seeking a

very large fee and in citing several comparably sized cases as precedent. Size of the recovery is not necessarily, however, a reliable measure of the risk undertaken, the quality of the legal work or the effort involved. The average settlement has increased markedly over the years and records are continuously broken. Mushrooming awards may be more attributable to external factors than to the work of counsel in a particular case. Cf. *PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities Litig. Study* (2005) at 3 (suggesting that the clout of lead plaintiffs under the PLSRA, steep declines in the stock prices of multibillion dollar corporations and growing third-party liability have converged to generate larger settlements).

And "it is not ten times as difficult to prepare, and try or settle a 10 million dollar case as it is to try a 1 million dollar case." Goldberger at 52, quoting *Union Carbide Consumer Prod. Bus. Securities Litig.*, 724 F. Supp. 160, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). "The huge fees in a huge case might be less a function of the amount or quality of the attorneys' work, or even of the risk undertaken, and more simply a function of the fact that the lawyers managed to find and bring a case with huge damages." Task Force on Contingent Fees, Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association, *Report on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation*, 25 Rev. Litig. 459, 470 (2006). This was, to a degree, true in this case. The size of the settlement was a function not only of counsel's labors but also the sheer size of this 65,000 member class. While counsel

proudly and appropriately deserve their share of the credit, the recovery's magnitude is also the product of the underlying circumstances.

The size of the settlement further undercuts the usefulness of the "benchmark" cases cited by counsel, all but one of which involved smaller recoveries. There is an emerging consensus in favor of lower, sometimes tapered, percentages for awards in large cases, prompted by record-breaking recoveries carrying the potential for windfall fees. See, e.g., *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.3d at 123 ("the sheer size of the instant fund makes a smaller percentage appropriate"); *Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litig.*, 148 F.3d at 340; *In re Smithkline Beckman Securities Litig.*, 751 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1990); but see *In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation*, No. MDL 1261, 2004 WL 1221350 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004). One study which analyzed over 1,100 common fund cases found that the average fee award for class action cases whose settlements were valued at or over \$100 million was 15.1 percent. Stuart J. Logan, Jack Moshman and Beverly C. Moore, Jr., *Attorney Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions*, 24 Class Action Rep. 169 (2003). The hourglass-shaped award here melds the declining percentage regime appropriate in a \$100 million case with the extraordinary effort lodged by counsel in obtaining the 30 million final dollars thought potentially unattainable.

This modest adjustment to counsel's fee request should not dilute recognition of their commendable work and their fidelity

to the class in the face of risks. Counsel in this case deserve sizable compensation and it is the intention of this Report & Recommendation to provide it, within the bounds of moderation and the guidelines of *Goldberger* and *Arbor Hill*.

**The Hourly Based Cross-Check**

The hourly fee analysis has two fundamental components: examining the attorney time records for reasonableness and necessity, and establishing appropriate hourly billing rates. *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 47.

**The Time and Services Billed**

In evaluating the hourly fees, I have reviewed the summaries provided by all counsel of their time and expenses; performed a moderately detailed examination of counsel's actual time records; reviewed the case file at the courthouse; and focused on certain tasks which consumed significant hours. I then reduced counsel's fee calculation by \$481,795.50.

These reductions fell into several broad categories: services that belong more appropriately in overhead, such as training; vague service descriptions; repetitive entries over multiple days; lack of corresponding entries between two timekeepers for an interactive service; full billing of travel time charges; excessive rounding of time charges; work on the fee application; and work inappropriately charged after the settlement was reached. Specifically, fees were reduced by \$228,142.75 for rounded or imprecise billing; \$6,008.75 for lack of corresponding entries; \$145,612.00 for unnecessary post-

settlement activity; \$11,480.00 for repetitive descriptions; \$8,500.25 for charges properly attributable to overhead; \$14,140.00 for overly vague descriptions; \$6,143.75 for excessive time on task; \$44,228.00 for half of out-of-town travel time; \$1,890.00 for non-compensable services; \$1,487.50 for work on fee applications; and \$14,162.50 for training.

For example, certain disallowances consisted of conferences between or among lawyers where one participant's time was recorded but not another's, or where excessive numbers of personnel were assigned to a particular task. If the former problem stems from inadequate recordkeeping, the remedy of disallowing the recorded time may seem harsh. But the law on this subject is settled: a lawyer applying for a fee bears the burden of recording all corresponding entries. See, e.g., *Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority*, 750 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Travel time is another consideration. A lawyer's reasonable travel time for client business purposes should be recoverable, as the practice in this jurisdiction is to charge at a unitary hourly rate and a lawyer not engaged in travel for a client's business could presumably otherwise be representing another client at his or her hourly billing rate. Once again, however, as with any attorney's time, the key is "reasonableness."

Applying this standard to the present case, long distance travel should not be viewed identically with local travel to Foley Square or opposing counsel's office in Manhattan. This is not to suggest that long distance travel should not be reimbursed at all.

A long distance trip, however, affords opportunities to perform work for the present or other clients, especially with advances in technology such as laptop computers and cellular phones. Travel time not productively spent should be adjusted.

For long-distance travel in which the time records contain no evidence of other work performed *en route*, I applied a reduction of 50 percent for billable hours, consistent with the methodology adopted by the district court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in *Agent Orange*, 818 F.2d at 230.

Certain other time entries bear telltale signs of rounding and estimation, rather than precise recording. A noticeable illustration is a pattern of some timekeepers of recording much of their daily time in even-hour increments, rather than a random mixture of daily hours ending in .00, .25, .50 and .75. Those hours were reduced by 10 percent. See *Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.*, 480 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2007); *New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey*, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding percentage reductions and placing the burden on fee applicants to keep and produce "accurate records" of work done and time spent). It bears emphasis that this reduction is recommended due to imprecision, not evidence of fabrication.

The reductions finally include several miscellaneous items, such as excessive time on task, work on a complaint in another action, preparation of an engagement letter and multiple attendees defending a deposition. The 4.25 hours recorded for preparation of counsel's fee application are not compensable. See *City of*

*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 560 F.2d 1093.

Once again, there is no evidence of purposeful inflation of time spent by any counsel. These are, however, charges that would draw objection from a scrutinizing client in the marketplace.

**Billing Rates**

A proper analysis also requires the establishment of appropriate hourly billing rates. In this regard, I have consulted authoritative sources, see Altman Weil, *Survey of Law Firm Economics; Hourly Billing Rates Continue to Rise*, National L. J. (Dec. 12, 2005); considered the submissions of class counsel; and drawn upon my own experience as a practitioner. See *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 56.

The attorney billing rates range from \$210 for the lowest billing associate to \$670 for the highest billing partner performing meaningful work. No adjustment is recommended for the base hourly rates here for several reasons. First, counsel have not increased their hourly rate requests to their current levels to compensate for delay in payment, as is a common practice approved by authorities as high as the United States Supreme Court. *Missouri v. Jenkins*, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); see also *Gierlinger v. Gleason*, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir. 1998). Instead, counsel's fees are based on rates in force between 2003 and 2006.

Second, all three firms are situated in major Northeastern metropolitan areas, where billing rates tend to be among the highest in the country. Altman Weil at 85. While these hourly

rates are high, they are within the bounds charged by top lawyers in the region. In addition, *Arbor Hill* holds that the "community" for rate-setting purposes may, where appropriate, be based on practice area rather than geography. In this regard, the rates charged by counsel here are commensurate with those recorded in other cases by leading members of the class action bar. *Logan, Moshman & Moore*, 24 Class Action Rep. at 195; see also *Goldberger*, 209 F.3d at 46 (citing \$550 hourly rate charged by leading class action practitioner in 2000).

Finally, the hourly charges here, with an appropriate multiplier, yield a result consistent with other awards and a fee reasonable under the circumstances. Because the computation here is used as a cross-check, rather than the primary determinant, dissection of the hourly rates would be unproductive and unnecessary to "prevent windfalls." Compare *Agent Orange*, 818 F.2d at 232-33.

The raw product of hours and rates is subject to an upward or downward multiplier to account for particular circumstances of the case. A multiplier is not, however, presumed. To the contrary, the unadjusted lodestar is "strongly presumed to be reasonable . . ." *Bolar Pharmaceutical*, 966 F.2d at 732. A multiplier bestows excessive compensation if the lodestar fee already reflects the fair value of the lawyers' services. See *Agent Orange*, 818 F.2d at 237.

Stated somewhat differently, an hourly rate inherently reflects risk, quality and other factors associated with an

attorney's competitiveness, skills and overhead. Adding a multiplier to a base rate that already accounts for these factors could result in windfall compensation to lawyers at the expense of their class clients. See *In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Securities Litigation*, 800 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).

Counsel's request of \$20,000,000 reflects a multiplier of 2.16 (against the unadjusted time charges), which they contend is reasonable. They assert that a "routine" multiplier sits between 3 and 5. Mem. in Supp. of Class Counsel's Motion at 43.

A consensus on multipliers has eluded courts and commentators. One district judge computed an average multiplier of 1.44, after conducting an analysis of 49 federal securities law actions litigated within the Second Circuit. See *In re McDonnell Douglas Equipment Leasing Securities Litig.*, 842 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); compare William J. Lynk, *The Courts and the Plaintiff's Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action Litigation*, 23 J. Legal Studies 185, 196 (1994) (reporting an average multiplier of 1.69 for class actions studied between 1973 and 1990); Wayne Schneider, *Courts Don't Have to Award Excessive Fees*, 20 NAPPA Report at 10 (range of multipliers between 1.37 and 3.1 in seven representative class action settlements in 2004 and 2005); *In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig.*, 243 F.3d 722, 742 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. *Kirby McInerney & Squire, LLP v. Joanne A. Aboff Family Trust*, 534 U.S. 889 (2001) (in surveying cases with common funds over \$100 million, court found multiplier of 1.35 to 2.99 common); *In re*

*NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig.*, 187 F.R.D. 465, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (multipliers between 3 and 4.5 are common); *Newberg*, §14:6 ("[m]ultiples ranging from one to four frequently are awarded in common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied"); see also *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.2d at 123 (3.5 multiplier); *WorldCom*, 388 F. Supp.2d at 354 (4.0 multiplier); *In re Avon Products, Inc. Securities Litig.*, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶97061, 1992 WL 349768 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (decision used percentage method, but stated that under the lodestar approach a risk multiplier of 2 to 3 would have been appropriate). Some courts have frowned upon multipliers in excess of two. See *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998).

The multiplier generated through the presumptively reasonable fee here is 2.06. This number falls comfortably within the prevailing range, is barely distinguishable from counsel's original request of 2.19 and bolsters the reasonableness of the percentage award that this Report recommends.

#### **Objections**

In arriving at the recommended percentages, I have considered the objections filed by putative class members to counsel's application. Indeed, the very fact that only four objections - all conveyed through the same attorney - were received from a class potentially comprising tens of thousands, informs my recommendation. See *Wal-Mart*, 396 F.2d at 118-19.

Objections were filed collectively by Douglas Powell,

Gregory Finn, Trina Hosmer and James E. Pentz. See Objection to Class Action Settlement & Request for Attorney's Fees. The objections were filed as part of a broader attack on the settlement, at a time when counsel had merely noticed their intention to file a future application no higher than 25 percent.

The objectors chiefly argued that the case involved very little discovery, no trial preparation, and little risk that it "would not settle for a substantial sum, especially after the settlement in the securities action." *Id.* at 4-5. Contending that "fees post-Goldberger have ranged from 4% to 16%," these class members also suggested that "[i]n prior settlements that combined securities and ERISA actions, the ERISA fee awards have been slightly less than the fees awarded in the main securities action." *Id.*

Although relatively few depositions were conducted, counsel dedicated enormous amounts of time to the review of millions of pages of documents. This not only falls within the realm of discovery, but can also be considered an indirect part of trial preparation. Moreover, the groundwork for the sophisticated mediation undertaken here resembled many elements of trial preparation. Extreme persuasion was needed to bring the case to its final objective of \$100 million.

The opponents are more on target with their assertions that the fee percentages warrant moderation and that ERISA settlements have often followed compromises of parallel securities claims. These factors have influenced my recommendation. Indeed, for the

middle tier of this award, I have emulated the 12 percent figure utilized in two cases cited by the objectors, see *In re Elan Securities*, 385 F. Supp.2d 363; *In re Interpublic Sec. Litig.*, 2004 WL 2397190, and I have adopted an overall percentage only slightly higher than the 15 percent they cite in *Global Crossing*.

#### **Disbursements**

Counsel sought reimbursement of their out-of-pocket disbursements in 12 categories: court filing fees, couriers, out-of-town travel, process service, document retrieval, experts and consultants, in-house reproduction; outside reproduction; court stenographers; postage; faxes; and telephone. After our conference, counsel voluntarily reduced their disbursement application. The ultimate request totaled \$267,552.64, or approximately three percent of the adjusted lodestar. Copies of the expense breakdowns for each firm are annexed to this Report as Appendix A.

The charges in each of those categories appear reasonable and commensurate with the types of services performed. At my suggestion, counsel have limited their in-house copying charges to 20 cents per page, consistent with Second Circuit Rule 39, restricted meal expense requests to those incurred out-of-town, eliminated basic subscription charges from their computer-based legal research requests and made other adjustments. I recommend that counsel's amended request of \$267,552.64 be allowed in full.

#### **Conclusion**

The fee award of \$17,865,395 synthesizes the particular

circumstances and distinct phases of this case, the tempering impact of a hypothetical client negotiating in the legal marketplace and a check against an hourly rate. The hourglass-shaped percentage structure used to arrive at this fee provides the incentives and rewards at the junctures where they are most needed and deserved, and is consistent with the trend toward lower percentages in large cases.

Dated: New York, New York  
August 7, 2007

Respectfully submitted,



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DAVID H. PIKUS  
Special Master

## **APPENDIX A**

EXHIBIT 7

## IN RE AOL TIME WARNER, INC. SECURITIES AND "ERUSA" LITIGATION

SCHATT NOBEL IZARD P.C.

## EXPENSE REPORT

From Inception Through May 31, 2006

<u>Expense Description</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
	<u>Total</u>
Court Reporters/Filing Fees	\$320.00
Transcripts	\$3,995.66
Document Reproductions	\$28,673.40
Postage/Delivery	\$1108.91
Telephone/Telecopier	\$54.37
Travel/Food/Lodging	\$8,824.02
Computer Consulting for Discovery/	\$47,017.36
Document Production	
Expert Accountant	\$23,505.31
Pacer Service Center	\$106.32
Notice of Filing of Class Action	<u>\$646.00</u>
TOTALS:	<u>114,251.35</u>

**IN RE AOL TIME WARNER, INC. ERISA LITIGATION****SCHIFFRIN BARROWAY TOPAZ & KESSLER, LLP****Expense Report****Case Inception - May 2006**

EXPENSE	AMOUNT
Meals, Hotels & Transportation	3,422.53
Photocopying	1,381.60
Telephone & Fax	339.84
Messenger, Courier & Federal Express	166.87
Postage	.37
The Michel-Shaked Group	26,802.09
Inseyet LLC	34,867.05
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>66,980.35</b>

IN RE AOL TIME WARNER ERISA LITIGATION

**STULL, STULL & BRODY EXPENSE CHART (EXHIBIT B)**

Period: Inception to May 25, 2006

As Revised and Refiled on June 4, 2007

Category	Amount
Court Filing Fees	\$300.00
Federal Express, Messenger Service	\$2,561.81
Airfares, Hotels, Trainfares, Car Rentals, Taxis & Meals (only out-of-town meals; all in-town meals excluded)	\$6,979.95
Attorney Process Service	\$120.00
Document & Courthouse Retrieval	\$889.18
Inseyet (Database Hosting & Consultancy)	\$34,867.05
Out-of-Office Copying	\$2,561.53
The Michel Shaked Group (Finance Experts)	\$9,401.84
Cravath, Swain & Moore (Hard Drive Documents)	\$8,372.00
Court Reporters	\$7,822.10
In-Office Copying (at a rate of .20 cents per page)	\$1,638.00
Postage Meter	\$61.39
Faxes (at a rate of \$1.00 per page)	\$1,302.00
Telephone Conference Calls	\$219.09
Rosenwald & Bildstein, CPAs	\$9,225.00
Total:	<b>\$86,320.94</b>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X  
IN RE AOL TIME WARNER ERISA x  
LITIGATION x 02 Cv. 8853 (SWK)  
x  
x MEMORANDUM OPINION  
-----X

SHIRLEY WOHL KRAM, U.S.D.J.

On September 27, 2006, the Court issued an opinion approving a \$100 million class action settlement (the "Settlement") reached in litigation brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") by participants in AOL Time Warner, Inc's ("AOLTW")<sup>1</sup> 401(k) defined contribution plans (the "Plans"). See In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., 02 Cv. 8853 (SWK), 2006 WL 2789862 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006). The Court reserved decision on counsel's application for attorney's fees, and on the three Named Plaintiffs' requests for "case contribution"--or incentive--awards. See id. at \*10. On August 9, 2007, David Pikus, the Special Master for attorney's fees, submitted his final report and recommendation ("R&R") to this Court and served it on all relevant parties. Following the passage of a comment period that yielded only positive feedback, the Court now adopts the R&R. Additionally, the Court awards Named Plaintiffs Rita Roberts Hill and Barbara

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<sup>1</sup> Although Defendant AOLTW has changed its name to Time Warner, Inc., for clarity, the Court will continue to refer to the merged entity as AOLTW.

Grant incentive awards of \$1,000 each, and Named Plaintiff Steven Winfield an award of \$500.

I. THE SPECIAL MASTER'S CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Special Master Pikus recommends an award of \$17,865,395 in fees and \$267,552.64 in expenses.<sup>2</sup> He reached this recommendation by employing a three-tiered percentage structure, which averages out to approximately 17.9% of the common fund. This tiered percentage structure reflects the varying degrees of risk and complexity inherent in different stages of the litigation, rewards class counsel for negotiating a settlement that was previously thought unattainable, and reflects the fact that the instant ERISA litigation followed the settlement of a parallel securities claim.

Special Master Pikus rightly recommends an award that avoids recourse to a mere benchmark. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the percentage of attorney's fees awarded in connection with ERISA settlements varies widely (R&R 25; see also Independent Fiduciary's Review of the Motion of Plaintiffs for

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<sup>2</sup> Special Master Pikus's fee recommendation is lower than class counsel's original request for 20 percent of the recovery (\$20 million), plus \$327,359.29 in expenses. Class counsel agreed to the reduction in expenses following a conference with the Special Master, in which the attendees resolved several issues surrounding class counsel's expense calculations. (See R&R 43-44 (listing reductions).)

an Award of Attorneys' Fees, for Reimbursement of Expenses and for Case Contribution Compensation to the Named Plaintiffs, July 18, 2006 ("Independent Fiduciary's July 18 Review")), in this case, the averaged 17.9% award is within the range of percentage awards that have been recently approved by courts of this circuit in connection with large ERISA settlements. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 02 Cv. 4816 (DLC), 2004 WL 2338151, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004) (approving an 18% award); In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (approving a 15% award); but see Banyai v. Mazur, 00 Cv. 9806 (SHS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25272, at \*23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (awarding 8.45%). Additionally, an independent fiduciary has already considered and approved class counsel's original fee application, which would have resulted in a fee and expense award higher than the one generated by the Special Master and adopted today. After considering the factors set forth in Goldberger and Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 493 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007),<sup>3</sup> which Special Master Pikus thoroughly

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<sup>3</sup> Subsequent to the drafting of the R&R, the Court of Appeals amended the Arbor Hill opinion. See Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d at 111 n.1. The portions of the opinion relied upon by the Special Master, however, remain unchanged. For ease of reference, the Court cites the amended version of the Arbor Hill opinion.

The impact of the Arbor Hill decision on common fund cases such as this one is unclear, as Arbor Hill involved a statutory fee shifting determination. (See R&R 7.) At least one court in

analyzes in the R&R,<sup>4</sup> as well as a cross-check against an hourly rate calculation,<sup>5</sup> the Court finds the recommendation to be fair

this circuit has applied Arbor Hill when assessing an application for attorney's fees and costs in an ERISA case. See Finkel v. E. End Elec. Assocs., Ltd., 06 Cv. 2169 (FB) (RLM), 2007 WL 2572167, at \*4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (adopting Magistrate Judge's calculation of attorney's fees and costs); 06 Cv. 2169 (FB), 2007 WL 2572169, at \*6-\*7 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2007) (applying Arbor Hill when calculating attorney's fees and costs). Because there have been no objections to Special Master Pikus's application of Arbor Hill in the case at hand, the Court merely notes the Special Master's consideration of that decision where relevant without deciding whether the case applies to all common fund cases.

Special Master Pikus incorporated the Arbor Hill decision into his analysis when generating a "presumptively reasonable fee" against which he could cross-check his calculated percentage award. In calculating the presumptively reasonable fee, Special Master Pikus was cognizant that "a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively," and that "such an individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case." Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d at 118. The Special Master concluded that class counsel will likely derive a significant reputational benefit from this case. (See R&R 35; see also R&R 38-40 (concluding that three-tiered percentage structure reflects market considerations).) Additionally, Special Master Pikus considered the twelve factors identified by the Arbor Hill Court (and originally enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)), eight of which are subsumed within the factors discussed in Goldberger. (See R&R 33-34.) The Court concurs with the Special Master's recognition of class counsel's likely reputational benefit, and with his conclusion that the recommended award comports with the additional, relevant Arbor Hill factors.

<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the Special Master presumed that class members in an ERISA case, unlike those in typical securities litigation, are not "sophisticated institutional investors whose decisions were fully volitional, unshackled from employee loyalty or the influence of sponsor steering" (R&R 16), and he therefore performed an especially thorough cross-check of the reasonableness of the percentage award.

and reasonable and adopts the R&R's recommended award.<sup>5</sup> The administration of the award is to be carried out under the terms set forth in the accompanying order approving the R&R and awarding attorney's fees and reimbursement of costs.

## II. INCENTIVE AWARDS FOR THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS

In addition to the fees and expenses sought by class counsel, the three Named Plaintiffs also request an incentive award of \$20,000 each. Because the R&R does not address this request, the Court has conducted its own analysis. "Incentive awards are not uncommon in class action cases and are within the discretion of the court." Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co., 228 F.R.D. 174, 187 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). Courts look for the

<sup>5</sup> The Special Master performed this cross-check because, under ERISA's fee-shifting provision, fees would be assessed against the defendant on the basis of an hourly rate. See McDonald ex rel Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006).

<sup>6</sup> In adopting the R&R, the Court also adopts the Special Master's response to the lone objection that the Settlement has received. (See R&R 49-51 (addressing collective objection filed on behalf of four class members).) Additionally, the objectors also contend that the Notice of Class Action Settlement fails to provide the information required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). (See Objection to Class Action Settlement and Request for Attorney's Fees and Case Contribution Awards 1-4.) In approving the Settlement, the Court reviewed the form and method of notice and concluded that "the notice procedures and the content of the notice were adequate," In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., 2006 WL 2789862, at \*10, so it need not address this point further. The Court addresses the objectors' arguments concerning the requested incentive awards in Part II. See infra note 10.

existence of "special circumstances" when determining whether an award is justified and, if so, in what amount. *Id.* Because the focus is on "special circumstances," "[n]o meaningful guidelines of broad applicability are discernible from the reported decisions as to the appropriate measure for an award . . . ." Roberts, 979 F. Supp. at 201-02. Incentive awards have thus varied in both the methodology underlying their calculation, see, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1283, 99 Cv. 0962 (RCC), 2006 WL 3498590, at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2006) (computing incentive award by using hourly rate for time spent in deposition), and their size, see Sheppard v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 94 Cv. 403 (JG), 2002 WL 2003206, at \*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002) (citing cases with range of incentive awards from \$336 to \$303,000).

Nevertheless, the case law reveals several factors often cited by courts in adjudicating named plaintiffs' requests for incentive awards in class actions, including:

the personal risk (if any) incurred by the plaintiff-applicant in becoming and continuing as a litigant, the time and effort expended by that plaintiff in assisting in the prosecution of the litigation or in bringing to bear added value (e.g., factual expertise), any other burdens sustained by that plaintiff in lending himself or herself to the prosecution of the claim, and of course, the ultimate recovery.

Roberts, 979 F. Supp. at 200. Additionally, when deciding requests for such awards, courts often look to the sums awarded

in similar cases, see, e.g., Gross v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 02 Cv. 4135 (RML), 2006 WL 318814, at \*6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2006); In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 03 Cv. 0085, 2005 WL 3008808, at \*18 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, Civ. A. 98-5055, Civ. A. 99-1000, Civ. A. 99-1341, 2004 WL 1221350, at \*19 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 203 F.R.D. 118, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and compare the named plaintiff's requested award to each class member's estimated pro rata share of the monetary judgment or settlement, see, e.g., In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1271 (D. Kan. 2006); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 355 & n.249 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated in part on other grounds by Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2005); Sheppard, 2002 WL 2003206, at \*6-\*7.

In this case, the Named Plaintiffs contributed to an ultimately successful class action suit. The Named Plaintiffs' counsel aver that, in filing suit, the Named Plaintiffs "risked that their current or future employers would flag them as potential problem employees because of their willingness to pursue litigation against an employer" (Pls.' Mot. 47), although they do not provide specific evidence of the purported risk's magnitude. Throughout several years of litigation, the Named Plaintiffs consulted with counsel, reviewed litigation

documents, produced documents for discovery, and responded to interrogatories. (See generally Pls.' Mot., Declaration of Rita Roberts Hill ("Hill Decl."); Declaration of Barbara Grant ("Grant Decl."); Declaration of Steven Winfield ("Winfield Decl.").) Two of the three Named Plaintiffs were deposed. (Named Pls.' Letter Correcting Mot., Oct. 3, 2007; Pls.' Mot., Supplemental Declaration of Rita Roberts Hill ("Hill Supp. Decl.") ¶ 2; Supplemental Declaration of Barbara Grant ("Grant Supp. Decl.") ¶ 6.)<sup>7</sup> Named Plaintiff Grant attended and spoke at the July 19, 2006 hearing on final approval of the Settlement. (See Tr. 17-18, July 19, 2006.) In short, the record demonstrates that all three Named Plaintiffs made sustained contributions to this litigation,<sup>8</sup> which ultimately resulted in one of the largest ERISA settlements ever recorded. (See Report

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<sup>7</sup> The defendants originally intended to depose all three Named Plaintiffs. Once the parties reached a settlement, however, the defendants canceled Named Plaintiff Winfield's deposition. (See Winfield Decl. ¶ 5.) At the time of the cancellation, Named Plaintiff Winfield had already engaged in preparation for the deposition. (Pls.' Mot., Supplemental Declaration of Steven Winfield ("Winfield Supp. Decl.") ¶ 3-4; Winfield Decl. ¶ 5.)

<sup>8</sup> Named Plaintiff Hill asserts that she dedicated 50-75 hours to the prosecution of her case (see Hill Decl. ¶ 6), and Named Plaintiff Winfield affirms that he spent approximately 30 hours on similar tasks (see Winfield Decl. ¶ 6), while Named Plaintiff Grant estimates that she put in 700 hours of labor (see Grant Decl. ¶ 4). Clearly, Named Plaintiff Grant's estimate is by far the largest. The Court notes, however, that not all of the activities mentioned in her itemized list are contributions that past courts have found compensable. (See, e.g., Grant Decl. ¶ 5.a-5.g.) In any event, the time commitment for all three Named Plaintiffs was substantial.

of the Independent Fiduciary for the Proposed Settlement in the AOL Time Warner ERISA Litigation, June 29, 2006, at 2 ("Other than the Enron settlement, the pool of funds available for distribution . . . is the largest ever awarded in an ERISA employer stock case.").) An incentive award of some kind is thus warranted.

Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the requested \$20,000 per-plaintiff fee would be excessive, especially in light of the indirect, and much smaller, monetary relief accruing to the more than 65,000 absent class members. See In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (reducing requested incentive award from \$15,000 to \$5,000, despite multimillion-dollar settlement amount, in light of fact that no individual class member stood to recover more than \$1,000 from settlement). Although it is true that, without the efforts of the Named Plaintiffs, this litigation may never have occurred, it is equally true that, without the tens of thousands of absent class members, the defendant may never have been induced to settle. An incentive award that compensates the Named Plaintiffs for the time they spent sitting for depositions, plus reasonable deposition preparation time, creates less of a disparity among class members while still rewarding the Named Plaintiffs for their efforts. Cf. In re Stock Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 3498590, at \*13.

In this case, Named Plaintiff Hill was deposed for 4.5 hours (Hill Supp. Decl. ¶ 2), and Named Plaintiff Grant was deposed for no more than 6.5 hours (see Grant Supp. Decl. ¶ 6). The deposed Named Plaintiffs should also be rewarded for reasonable preparation time.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, given that his deposition was canceled at the eleventh hour, Named Plaintiff Winfield also should be rewarded for time reasonably spent in preparation. Accordingly, the Court concludes that awards of

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<sup>9</sup> Again, the Named Plaintiffs vary in the amount of time that they reportedly dedicated to deposition preparation: Named Plaintiff Hill submitted an estimate of 30 hours (see Hill Supp. Decl. ¶ 3); Named Plaintiff Winfield "expended approximately 12-14 hours preparing for [his] deposition and adjusting [his] schedule" (Winfield Supp. Decl. ¶ 4); and Named Plaintiff Grant reports that she dedicated 67 hours preparing for, traveling to, and sitting for her deposition (see Grant Supp. Decl. ¶ 4-7). Although the Court questions neither the Named Plaintiffs' accuracy, nor their veracity, it concludes that it would not be fair and reasonable for the award to cover all of the claimed "preparation time." For example, though there may be no "bright-line formula of preparation time versus deposition time to be used in all cases," Monsour's Inc. v. Menu Maker Foods, Inc., 05 Cv. 1204 (MLB), 2007 WL 437780, at \*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2007); see also Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Niagara, LP v. Caremeuse N.A., 02 Cv. 814C(F), 2007 WL 2283768, at \*2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007); Constellation Powersource, Inc. v. Select Energy, Inc., 3:04 Cv. 983 (MRK), 2007 WL 188135, at \*8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2007), the Court is unwilling to reward Named Plaintiff Grant for approximately 60 hours of "preparation" for a deposition that lasted no more than 6.5 hours. Even in the case of expert witnesses, preparation time of that magnitude is not customarily considered compensable. Cf. Packer v. SN Servicing Corp., 243 F.R.D. 39, 42-43 (D. Conn. 2007) (collecting cases); Constellation Powersource, Inc., 2007 WL 188135, at \*8 (holding that party whose expert was deposed "should not be reimbursed for more hours in preparation for the deposition than the deposition itself consumed").

\$1,000 each to Named Plaintiffs Hill and Grant, and \$500 to Named Plaintiff Winfield, are fair and reasonable.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The Court briefly addresses the single objection (brought collectively by four class members) lodged against the request for incentive awards. First, the objectors assert that the requested incentive award is "inherently corrupting" and imply that it led the Named Plaintiffs to accept a suboptimal settlement. (See Objection to Class Action Settlement and Request for Attorney's Fees and Case Contribution Awards ("Objection") 6.) Courts should ensure that the possibility of an incentive award does not induce class representatives to put their own interests above those of the class. See, e.g., McBean v. City of New York, 233 F.R.D. 377, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); White v. Nat'l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1406 (D. Minn. 1993). In this case, however, the Court has already concluded that the Settlement--negotiated at arm's length by "experienced counsel, overseen and assisted by a court-appointed special master," and approved by an independent fiduciary--is both procedurally and substantively fair. In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., 2006 WL 2789862, at \*5, \*5-\*9. Notably, the independent fiduciary expressed no objection to the \$20,000 award requested by the Named Plaintiffs. (See Independent Fiduciary's July 18 Review 1.) Moreover, "[denying] the awards now would not alter the incentives that existed at the time the [S]ettlement was negotiated." McBean, 233 F.R.D. at 391 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Court will not deny the Named Plaintiffs' request for an incentive award on this ground.

Next, the objectors imply that, pursuant to the restrictions in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Court can only approve an award that compensates a lead plaintiff for "lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in a case." (Objection 7.) The PSLRA, however, does not apply to ERISA litigation. See Smith v. Dominion Bridge Corp., 96 Cv. 7580, 2007 WL 1101272, at \*11 n.12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2007) (noting that PSLRA does not apply to ERISA litigation); Hill v. Tribune Co., 05 C 2602, 2005 WL 3299144, at \*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding certain PSLRA provisions inapposite in ERISA litigation). Therefore, although out-of-pocket costs provide a "powerful basis" for an incentive award, Sheppard, 2002 WL 2003206, at \*6 n.9, they are not a prerequisite for such an award in ERISA cases.

Finally, the objectors argue that a \$20,000 per-Named Plaintiff incentive award is excessive because it is out of proportion with the amount that each absent class member stands

No doubt the Named Plaintiffs expected to receive an award much closer to the \$20,000 that they each requested. Yet "an expectation is not an entitlement," Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir. 1986), and the desire to incentivize lead plaintiff participation must be tempered by an equally important quest for parity and fairness among class members. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that an incentive award is appropriate in the instant case, and that awards of \$1,000 each to the deposed Named Plaintiffs and \$500 to the un-deposed Named Plaintiff are fair, reasonable, and sufficient to compensate the Named Plaintiffs for their consistent efforts on behalf of the class.

### III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court approves an award to Co-Lead Counsel of \$17,865,395 in fees and \$267,552.64 in expenses, and incentive awards of \$1,000 each to Named Plaintiffs Hill and Grant and \$500 to Named Plaintiff Winfield. An appropriate Final Order and Judgment accompanies this Opinion.

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to recover under the Settlement. (See Objection 7.) The Court has taken proportionality into account. Indeed, it is the primary justification offered for the reduction of the incentive award to an amount that comports with the \$1,000-\$2,000 range that at least one of the objectors is willing to accept. (See Objection 8.)

SO ORDERED.

*[Signature]*  
SHIRLEY WOHL KRAM  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: New York, New York  
October 26, 2007

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS**

**IN RE SPRINT CORPORATION  
ERISA LITIGATION**

**Case No. 03-2202-JWL**

**This Order Relates to All Cases**

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**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

This is a putative class action involving claims of alleged breach of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (“ERISA”). Plaintiffs assert claims as participants in and on behalf of three different retirement savings plans against defendants Sprint Corporation, committees that participated in administering the plans and individual members of those committees, the individual members of Sprint’s board of directors, and the third-party trustee for the plans, Fidelity Management Trust Company. The matter is presently before the court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (doc. #229) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses and for an Award to the Plaintiffs (doc. #233). For the reasons explained below, the court will finally approve the parties’ settlement and award plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of \$3.9 million out of which \$5,000 is to be paid to each of the four named plaintiffs.

## NATURE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

In these consolidated ERISA cases, named plaintiffs Fran Lindholm, Anton P. Spanier, LaVonne M. Easter, and Jeffery M. Snethen allege that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing three of Sprint's defined contribution 401(k) retirement plans to remain so highly invested in Sprint stock during a time period when Sprint stock was an imprudent investment and by failing to disclose material information to plan participants. The defendants include Sprint corporation and various Sprint employees, officers, and directors who were allegedly involved with administering the plans, as well as the third-party trustee for the plans.

Plaintiffs' complaint largely survived defendants' motions to dismiss. *See generally In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig.*, Case No. 03-2202-JWL, 2004 WL 2182186, at \*1-\*7 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2004); *In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig.*, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Kan. 2004). Plaintiffs then filed a motion for class certification (doc. #83). Before that motion was at issue, the parties announced they had reached an agreement to settle this case. On motion, the court issued an order preliminarily certifying a class for settlement purposes, preliminary approving the proposed settlement, approving the form and dissemination of class notice, and setting the fairness hearing (doc. #223). The court held the initial fairness hearing on May 15, 2006.

On May 17, 2006, the court issued an Order for Supplemental Briefing & Hearing (doc. #244) because the court had significant concerns about some of the issues that had developed at the fairness hearing about which the court did not believe the parties had

adequately developed the record—namely, although the court had been aware prior to the fairness hearing that the proposed settlement conferred different types of relief on different categories of plaintiffs, the court had not been aware that those differences created such an arguably significant disparity in the value of the benefits that the proposed settlement would confer on the different categories of employees. The court also noted that the record did not support the requested \$15,000 award to each of the named plaintiffs. The court allowed the proponents of the settlement and any objectors who wished to be heard to submit supplemental briefing on those issues and the court set this case for a supplemental hearing on May 26, 2006.

On May 23, 2006, the parties brought to the court's attention the fact that notice of the initial fairness hearing was not mailed to a significant number of absentee class members. After reviewing additional briefing submitted by the parties, the court issued an order (doc. #257) approving the form and dissemination of a supplemental class notice and setting a second fairness hearing for July 26, 2006. The parties and objectors filed additional papers relating to the settlement. The court held the second fairness hearing on July 26, 2006.

The court has evaluated the terms of the proposed settlement, all of the papers submitted by the settlement proponents, the objections asserted by settlement objectors, and the arguments and evidence presented at both the initial fairness hearing and the second fairness hearing. After thorough consideration of the record, the court is now prepared to rule.

## FINAL APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

The court may approve a settlement on finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C). The court’s main concern in evaluating the settlement is to ensure that the rights of passive class members are not jeopardized by the proposed settlement. 7B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §1797.1, at 79 (3d ed. 2005); *see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that the Rule 23(e) inquiry “protects unnamed class members from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise”). Moreover, it is generally accepted that where settlement precedes class certification (e.g., approval for settlement and certification are sought simultaneously, as is the case here) district courts must be “even more scrupulous than usual” when examining the fairness of the proposed settlement. *In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 391 F.3d 516, 534 (3d Cir. 2004); *accord Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also* Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.612, at 313 (2004) (“Class actions certified solely for settlement, particularly early in the case, sometimes make meaningful judicial review more difficult and more important. Courts have held that approval of settlement class actions under Rule 23(e) requires closer judicial scrutiny than approval of settlements reached only after class certification has been litigated through the adversary process.”).

The Tenth Circuit has set forth four non-exclusive factors which this court must consider in evaluating whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate: (1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated; (2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt; (3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation; and (4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable. *Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.*, 314 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). Another factor in this case to which the parties, the court, and the objectors have devoted considerable attention is the extent to which the proposed settlement treats particular segments of the class differently from others not only in terms of the type of relief, but more specifically in terms of the arguably significant disparity in the value of that relief. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.62, at 317 (noting that courts have examined the extent to which “particular segments of the class are treated significantly differently from others”). The proponents of the settlement are responsible for providing sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the settlement is fair. *Gottlieb v. Wiles*, 11 F.3d 1004, 1015 (10th Cir. 1993).

#### I. The Structure of the Settlement

In the parties’ Class Action Settlement Agreement dated February 2, 2006, they agreed to a structured settlement of this litigation. Key to an understanding the structure of the settlement is an understanding of the changes Sprint’s corporate structure has undergone since the time when the parties first began serious settlement negotiations. In 2005, the

merger between Sprint and Nextel gained the necessary regulatory and shareholder approvals and became final, culminating in the creation of Sprint Nextel Corporation. As the two companies combined, this provided an opportunity for Sprint to evaluate and restructure its retirement savings plans which are the basis for this lawsuit. At the time of the merger, it was planned that Sprint's Local Telecommunications Division would be spun off from Sprint Nextel into a new, separate company once the necessary approvals were obtained. Ultimately, this resulted in the spin-off of Embarq Corporation in May of 2006. With that spin-off a significant number of the class member plaintiffs became Embarq employees. As a consequence of the spin-off, bargaining unit employees are no longer employed by Sprint; rather, they are employed (if at all) by Embarq. With this background in mind, then, the court will discuss the key components of the settlement agreement.

- Cash Settlement Fund – Sprint has paid \$4,000,000 to a cash settlement fund which is to be paid to the plans and distributed among former plan participant class members according to a plan of allocation. These former plan participants consist of Embarq employees (including those who are subject to collective bargaining agreements with Embarq) as well as former Sprint employees who are no longer with Sprint Nextel or Embarq.
- Increased Vesting – Effective January 1, 2006, Sprint increased on a pro rata basis the vested amount of matching contributions in the accounts of former employees who were less than 100% vested at the time of separation from Sprint and who remain participants in the three retirement plans at issue in this lawsuit, in a uniform percentage amount which

in the aggregate totals \$1.6 million. This aspect of the settlement, then, only pertains to former Sprint employees who remain participants in the plans and who are less than 100% vested.

- Increased Match – Effective January 1, 2006, and continuing until at least January 1, 2007, Sprint increased its matching contributions to its employees' 401(k) accounts to at least 100% of the first 4% of eligible compensation. The parties had originally estimated the value of the increased match to be \$17.9 million, but they later determined this estimated value was incorrect because it was based on the projected amount of the increased match for all legacy Sprint employees,<sup>1</sup> not just those who fall within the class definition. The parties have now estimated this aspect of the settlement to be worth approximately \$8.95 million. Only current Sprint employees, not Embarq employees or any other former Sprint employees, benefit from the Increased Match as set forth in the settlement agreement.

- Plan Amendments – Effective January 1, 2006, and continuing until at least January 1, 2007, Sprint enacted the following plan amendments to its employees' retirement savings plan:

- 1.) increased limits on participants' pretax contributions to 80% of eligible compensation;
- 2.) immediate vesting of future matching contributions;

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<sup>1</sup> The term "legacy Sprint employee" is a term of art at Sprint Nextel which refers to employees who were employed by a Sprint subsidiary company and, after the merger, remain employed by a Sprint Nextel subsidiary company except for those companies that became Embarq subsidiaries.

- 3.) ability to diversify future matching contributions; and
- 4.) unlocking matching contributions previously made by Sprint.

As with the Increased Match, the Plan Amendments only apply to current Sprint employee class members. But, in the settlement agreement, Sprint agrees to use its “best efforts” to implement similar amendments for the retirement savings plans for Embarq employees (which includes those who are subject to collective bargaining agreements with Embarq).

- Participant Communications Improvements – Effective January 1, 2006, Sprint enhanced its online resources and communications to its plan participants and made available seminars and meetings with financial advisors. For former employees, these enhancements include two one-hour financial planning meetings with Ameriprise financial advisors, which Sprint has estimated to have a retail value of approximately \$350-\$400 to each former employee.
- Settlement Expense Fund – Sprint will pay up to \$3.9 million to cover the attorneys’ fees of class counsel, litigation costs and expenses (including the costs of class notice, independent fiduciary review of the settlement, and settlement administration), and any awards to the named plaintiffs.

The class members, then, will receive different aspects of the settlement depending on whether they are current or former Sprint employees and, if they are former employees, whether they remain participants in the plans and whether they are 100% vested. All former employees will share in the \$4 million Cash Settlement Fund and will receive two one-hour financial planning meetings. Those who are still participants in the plans and who are not

100% vested will receive the Increased Vesting. Current Sprint employees, on the other hand, will receive the Increased Match, the Plan Amendments, and the Participant Communications Improvements. Sprint has agreed to use its best efforts to implement similar plan amendments for Embarq employees. All of these aspects of the settlement are net of attorneys' fees and related expenses.

As the parties had originally presented the various terms of the settlement agreement to the court, it appeared there was an arguably significant disparity between the different categories of class members inasmuch as the current Sprint employees seemed to be receiving at least three times (on an average, per-employee basis) the value former employees were receiving. Thus, the court was concerned that Sprint might have been giving favored treatment to its own employees at the expense of its former employees, a significant number of which had just then become former Sprint Nextel employees by virtue of the Embarq spin-off. The arguably significant disparity in the value of relief did not seem to be attributable to any differences in the strength or value of the class members' claims.<sup>2</sup> Since the court voiced these concerns, the parties have focused their attention on the different types of relief being granted to the different categories of plaintiffs. This has been helpful to the court in

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<sup>2</sup> The court wishes to clarify that it has never stated that the recovery for the different categories of class members must be equal. Furthermore, the court never stated that it would not grant settlement approval notwithstanding these discrepancies. The court was simply of the opinion that the parties had not adequately developed this important issue in their original submissions to the court or at the initial fairness hearing, and the court believed that the disparity was potentially significant enough that it warranted a greater level of attention from the parties in order to allow the court to scrutinize the settlement more meaningfully.

attempting to evaluate whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court is not attempting to determine whether the settlement has equal value to each of the class plaintiffs. The court understands that the value class members will receive depends upon a number of factors such as their level of investment in the plans as well as their ability and willingness to capitalize on the different types of relief being offered under the terms of the settlement. But, the court believes that in determining whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate it is important to understand the settlement not only in terms of its application to the class as a whole, but also in terms of its anticipated impact on different class members.

Approximately 21,690 of the class member plaintiffs are current Sprint Nextel employees. They will receive increased matching contributions valued at \$8.95 million, or approximately \$413 per employee. It should be noted, however, that Randall Parker, the Sprint/Embarq benefits representative who testified at the second fairness hearing, testified that although the settlement agreement called for an increased match of 100% of the first 4% of eligible compensation, Sprint Nextel ultimately chose to implement a retirement plan with an increased match of 100% of the first 5% of eligible compensation—a plan with more beneficial terms than the one required by the settlement agreement. In fact, he testified that this choice was also driven by competitive considerations. Thus, although this aspect of the settlement certainly has meaningful value, that value is attenuated somewhat by the fact that this result was not solely attributable to the settlement agreement. Additionally, these class members will receive the benefit of the Plan Amendments such as the contribution ceiling

increase, immediate vesting, diversification of future company matching contributions, and unlocking of unvested units. They also will receive the Participant Communication Improvements. The parties have not attempted to place a value on the Plan Amendments or the Participant Communication Improvements for purposes of obtaining final approval of the settlement, but suffice it to say that the court is satisfied that these aspects of the settlement certainly have some value to the current Sprint Nextel employee class members. It is important to note that in order for these employees to obtain the full value of the settlement they must continue to work for Sprint Nextel and contribute adequately to their 401(k) plans. On average, then, notwithstanding the somewhat attenuated value of the increased match, it appears that the value of relief for this category of plaintiffs likely is in excess of \$413 per plaintiff.

Approximately 63,275 class member plaintiffs are former plan participants. Of these, approximately 16,409 are current Embarq employees (including Embarq employees who are subject to collective bargaining agreements) and 46,866 are former Sprint and/or Embarq employees. These class members will receive their share of the \$4 million Cash Settlement Fund pursuant to the allocation plan, or approximately \$63 per plaintiff. Unlike the various plan amendments which apply to the current Sprint Nextel employee class plaintiffs, this component of the settlement is not contingent upon these class members' future behavior. Additionally, these former plan participants are entitled to financial planning services with an estimated retail value of \$350. Of course, the extent to which they will use these services is uncertain. Undoubtedly, some will and some will not. But, nonetheless, this relief is

available to them and creates some value for them. Thus, the value of relief for this category of plaintiffs is approximately \$63-\$413 per plaintiff. Also, Sprint has also agreed to use its best efforts to implement similar Plan Amendments for the current Embarq employees. Based on the Embarq representative's testimony at the second fairness hearing in this case, the court is satisfied that as a practical matter this aspect of the settlement already has and will continue to have real value for the Embarq employees, albeit perhaps some more than others depending on the outcome of union negotiations. Thus, this aspect of the settlement has the potential to add yet additional value to the Embarq employees' portion of the settlement.

Approximately 3,844 class member plaintiffs are former employees who still are plan participants and were less than 100% vested at the time of their separation from employment. These class members will receive their pro rata shares of the \$1.6 million in Increased Vesting, or approximately \$416 per plaintiff. Like the \$4 million cash settlement for the other category of former employees, this aspect of the settlement is not contingent upon these class members' future behavior. This category of class members also will receive financial planning services with an estimated retail value of \$350. Again, this creates some value for this category of class plaintiffs. In sum, these class members will receive a settlement value in the range of \$416-\$766 per plaintiff. Although this category of class members stands to receive the greatest monetary benefit, because they are no longer Sprint Nextel or Embarq employees there is no potential for them to reap the benefits of the other nonmonetary

components of the settlement in terms of more favorable restructuring of the Sprint Nextel and/or Embarq plans.

Having analyzed the settlement structure and the estimated impact of the settlement on the various categories of the class member plaintiffs, then, the court will now analyze the four factors the court must evaluate in determining whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

## **II. Analysis of the Four Factors**

### *A. The Proposed Settlement Was Fairly and Honestly Negotiated*

The court is satisfied that the settlement in this case was fairly and honestly negotiated. Plaintiffs' counsel conducted an extensive investigation of the allegations in the complaint and the losses suffered by the plans. They obtained and reviewed tens of thousands of pages of documents including plan documents and materials, communications with plan participants, internal Sprint documents, SEC filings, press releases, public statements, news articles, and other publications and documents. Defendants vigorously challenged the adequacy of the allegations in plaintiffs' consolidated complaint by filing two rounds of motions to dismiss. At the time serious settlement discussions began, plaintiffs had filed a motion for class certification and that motion was almost at issue. The parties had begun to engage in discovery.

Although the parties began serious settlement discussions relatively early in the case, the timing of the settlement negotiations was the fortuitous consequence of being able to capitalize on the timing of the Sprint/Nextel merger and the opportunity to restructure

Sprint's retirement plans during the imminent blending of the two sets of workforces. Sprint was unwilling to pay much cash to settle this case given its perception of the case's weaknesses. By utilizing the opportunity to restructure Sprint's retirement plans to benefit the existing plan participants, the parties were able to allocate the available cash to former plan participants. In doing so, they attempted to structure the settlement so as to maximize the settlement benefits for class as a whole and for each of category of class member plaintiffs. These negotiations were further complicated by the then-anticipated spin-off of Sprint's Local Telecommunications Division because the parties needed to be able to attempt to predict the consequences of that spin-off on the settlement.

In sum, counsel litigated this case during its early phases aggressively and in a manner that demonstrated legal expertise in this area of the law. Then, once the opportunity for settlement came about, plaintiffs' counsel pushed for creative settlement possibilities that worked to maximize the settlement value for the class as a whole as well as for the various categories of class members. The settlement is a result of litigation-related considerations and uncertainties as well as an opportunity for improvements in Sprint's employee benefit plans. The court is satisfied that this factor weighs in favor of settlement approval.

*B. Serious Questions of Law and Fact Place the Ultimate Outcome in Doubt*

For the detailed reasons set forth on the record by the parties at the first fairness hearing on May 15, 2006, the court wholeheartedly agrees with the parties' assessment of this case. In short, numerous serious questions of law and fact placed the ultimate outcome of this case in real doubt. Having ruled upon defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is familiar with the law in similar cases and, to put it mildly, it would have been interesting to see if and how plaintiffs could have survived the summary judgment phase. Although plaintiffs survived defendants' motion to dismiss, they did so only under the very narrow standard of review which the court must apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Additionally, even if plaintiffs could have survived defendants' motions for summary judgment, additional serious questions of law and fact also would have placed in doubt the value of the recovery plaintiffs might have been able to obtain. Although the value of the settlement might not seem like much for a case with such a potentially monumental scale at its inception, the court believes plaintiffs are faring well under the terms of the settlement compared to what the outcome of this case probably would have been in the absence of the settlement given the developing state of the law and the facts on issues that likely would have predominated this case in determining both liability and damages. The court cannot overstate the significance of this factor in the court's ultimate determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. This factor weighs heavily in favor of approving the settlement.

*C. Value of Immediate Recovery*

The third factor the court must consider is "whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation." *Gottlieb v. Wiles*, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993). The value of the settlement must be weighed against "the possibility of some greater relief at a later time, taking into consideration the additional risks and costs that go hand in hand with protracted litigation."

*Id.* at 1015. Here, if plaintiffs were to proceed with this litigation through a trial on the merits, there is a substantial risk that they would not have been able to establish liability and that the amount of damages ultimately awarded may have been less than the amounts guaranteed by the settlement. Meanwhile, the size of the recovery would have been reduced by additional costs incurred by plaintiffs' counsel in taking this case through trial and likely appeals. Given the meager prospects of establishing any significant amount of damages, the mere possibility of obtaining more meaningful relief in the future is bleak. Thus, the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation. This factor, too, weighs heavily in favor of settlement approval. Indeed, it is the combination of the second and third factors – that serious questions of law and fact place the ultimate outcome of this litigation in doubt combined with the fact that the possibility of obtaining better relief after protracted and expensive litigation is unlikely – that weigh the most heavily in the court's determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class members.

*D. The Parties' Judgment that the Settlement is Fair and Reasonable*

With respect to the fourth factor, the court is satisfied that the attorneys on both sides of this case genuinely believe the settlement is fair and reasonable. They believe it provides significant benefits to the class members, particularly when measured against the significant risks to any recovery if the action were to proceed to summary judgment and/or trial. Plaintiffs counsel explains that ERISA cases involving allegedly imprudent offering of employer stock in 401(k) plans are a fairly new type of class action as to which there has

been little, if any, governing case law by the Supreme Court or by the Tenth Circuit. Defendants' counsel explains that many of the class members' claims were subject to a variety of defenses that would have barred their ERISA claims entirely. Collectively, then, counsel believe that the settlement confers significant benefits on the class of plaintiffs compared to what they probably would have received in the absence of settlement. This factor also weighs in favor of settlement approval.

### **III. Objections by Class Members**

#### *A. Objections of Donald V. Jones*

Donald V. Jones filed objections to the settlement (doc. #224) in which he raises two objections. First, he contends that all members of the class should be informed of what their benefit would be before the settlement is approved, not after. Second, on a related note, Mr. Jones argues that there should be a single list on which the benefit each class member is to receive under the settlement should be listed. The court overrules both of these objections. Notice provided to the class is adequate where it sets forth the formula for distributing the settlement fund among the class members. *Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States*, 54 Fed. Cl. 791, 806 (2002); *In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.*, 186 F.R.D. 403, 429-30 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("Notice is adequate where the class member is notified of the formula of allocation."); 3 Newberg on Class Actions § 8.32, at 265 (4th ed. 2002) ("It is unnecessary for the settlement distribution formula to specify precisely the amount that each individual class member may expect to recover."); *cf.* Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.312, at 295 (2004) (stating the settlement notice should "explain the procedures for allocating and

distributing settlement funds"). In fact, it is not at all unusual for class members not to know the amounts they will be receiving until after final approval. *Nat'l Treasury Employees Union*, 54 Fed. Cl. at 806. Here, the process of determining the amount of each class member's recovery will require a complex calculation: first, the plan administrator must calculate each participant's and former participant's net loss, then exclude those with a net gain, calculate each participant's and former participant's preliminary fractional share, use that to calculate the preliminary dollar recovery, exclude those with a de minimis preliminary dollar recovery of less than \$25, then recalculate as many times as necessary so as to arrive at a final fractional share and final dollar recovery for each participant and former participant who is entitled to receive more than a de minimis amount until the sum of the final dollar recoveries equals the cash settlement fund. In evaluating a plan of allocation, the court must ensure that the distribution of funds is fair and reasonable. *In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 225 F.R.D. 436, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). When formulated by competent and experienced class counsel, as is the case here, an allocation plan need only have a reasonable, rational basis. *Id.* A reasonable plan may consider the relative strength and values of different categories of claims. *Id.* In this case, the court is satisfied that the plan of allocation is fair and reasonable because it appears to be rationally based on the participants' proportionate losses in the 401(k) plans. Such a "[p]ro-rata distribution of settlement funds based on investment loss is clearly a reasonable approach." *Id.*

*B. Objections of William Don Cline*

William Don Cline filed objections to the settlement (doc. #225) in which he raises two concerns. First, he wants to know if the settlement can be distributed to his Individual Retirement Account on a tax-free basis. The parties have assured the court that the settlement proceeds will be distributed through the plans on a pre-tax basis and, consequently, they can be rolled over on a tax-free basis into an IRA.

Second, Mr. Cline objects to the settlement on the grounds that he believes that combining the Sprint FON and Sprint PCS stock on a two-PCS-for-one basis was unfair. The claims in this case, however, do not relate to the FON and PCS stock combination and therefore Mr. Cline's objection is beyond the scope of this case. According to plaintiffs, numerous other lawsuits already are pending in connection with the allocations between the wireline operations and the wireless operations before the recombination of the tracking stocks and breach of fiduciary duties in the recombination. Because this objection does not present any grounds indicating that the settlement is unfair, unreasonable, and/or inadequate as it relates to the allegations asserted in this case, then, this objection is overruled.

C. *Objections of Bonnie Faye Johns*

Bonnie Faye Johns filed objections to the settlement (doc. #226) in which she objects to the allocation formula for distributing the cash settlement fund. The thrust of her objection is that the allocation formula is unreasonable because plan participants will not recover all or the vast majority of their total losses. But the court is satisfied that the plan of allocation is fair and reasonable and that the overall recovery is adequate. Ms. Johns' objection erroneously presumes that the alleged misconduct that is the subject of this lawsuit was

responsible for the full drop in the value of plan assets during the relevant time period; that settlement recovery should be 100% of the drop while ignoring the risks of plaintiffs being unable to establish liability, causation, and damages; and the possibility that the class might recover nothing at all in the absence of the settlement. As previously explained, serious questions of law and fact exist which place the ultimate outcome of this lawsuit in doubt. Ms. Johns' objection unrealistically fails to discount the value of this case in light of the uncertainties that would be presented by ongoing litigation. Contrary to Ms. Johns' objection, the court does not believe that the amount of the settlement is inadequate at all. As such, her objection is overruled.

*D. Objections of Edward C. McCulloch, Robert Herrera, James W. Jarbo, and Janis L. Fisher<sup>3</sup>*

Objectors Edward C. McCulloch, Robert Herrera, James W. Jarbo, and Janis L. Fisher were active objectors in this case. These class members are members of the local unions of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (IBEW). They filed written objections through counsel Francis J. Morton, who also appeared at the first and second fairness hearings on their behalf. It is the court's understanding that the IBEW objectors formerly were employed by Sprint and are now employed by Embarq under collective bargaining agreements. Messrs. McCulloch and Herrera were participants in the Centel

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<sup>3</sup> The court notes that it has reservations about the extent to which the IBEW objectors themselves (as opposed to the unions generally) have standing to assert some of the objections they have asserted. Mr. Morton has not discussed the actual terms of the collective bargaining agreements which apply to these four objectors' employment with Embarq.

Retirement Savings Plan for Bargaining Unit Employees (CRS Plan BUE). Mr. Jarbo and Ms. Fisher were participants in the Sprint Retirement Savings Plan for Bargaining Unit Employees (SRS Plan BUE). As former Sprint employees who are now employed by Embarq, under the settlement they fall within the category of employees who will receive a portion of the Cash Settlement Fund according to the plan of allocation, two meetings with a financial advisor, and Sprint agrees to use its best efforts to implement similar amendments with respect to their retirement plans. This group of objectors raised a myriad of objections to the settlement.

In the objections they first filed with the court (doc. #227), they objected to the settlement on the following grounds: they are not receiving the Increased Match; Sprint Nextel's obligation to use its best efforts to implement similar plan amendments is illusory and Embarq should make an outright offer the plan amendments to them; Sprint Nextel can change or withdraw the Plan Amendments on January 1, 2007; the settlement does not clearly indicate that bargaining unit employees will receive part of the Cash Settlement Fund; they are not being offered the Participant Communication Improvements; and the class notice is confusing because it caused bargaining unit employees to believe they would receive the Increased Match. Following the court's order allowing supplemental briefing concerning the arguably significant disparity in the value of the settlement to the different categories of class members, these objectors filed a supplemental brief (doc. #250). In that brief, they point out that the two one-hour meetings with a financial advisor is of no value to bargaining unit employees because free financial planning services already are available to them through the

local unions. They continue to argue that the “best efforts” clause is illusory. Given these considerations, these objectors argue that the settlement is designed to disproportionately favor the group of employees Sprint is keeping. Prior to the second fairness hearing, these objectors filed another set of objections (doc. #263). In those objections, they contend that the proposed settlement is unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate for the reasons previously stated, and also for largely the same reasons stated in their prior objections. Summarized, they believe all class members should receive substantially equal shares of the settlement value, based on the damage period of 1998 to the present, and should not favor the class members Sprint chose to retain as employees. They point out that the aspect of the settlement which pertains to current Sprint Nextel employees benefits all Sprint Nextel employees, not just the plaintiff class members. Again, they point out that financial advisor services are of no tangible value to bargaining unit employees and, therefore, Sprint should simply give \$300 to those union members who elect to receive the money in lieu of financial adviser services. And, they point out that Sprint Nextel already is not living up to the “best efforts” clause because Embarq representatives have refused to meet with members of the objector unions to attempt to implement similar plan amendments.

The overall thrust of the vast majority of these objections is that the IBEW objectors believe they are getting shortchanged under the terms of the settlement, particularly compared to current Sprint Nextel employees. After careful consideration of this argument, the court disagrees with the IBEW objectors’ view that the settlement is skewed against them. The IBEW objectors, like all Embarq employees, are receiving their fair share of the

Cash Settlement Fund which current Sprint Nextel employees are not receiving. Although Embarq employees are not receiving the \$8.95 million Increased Match which current Sprint Nextel employees are receiving, that Increased Match is the most dubious aspect of the “settlement.” The settlement agreement itself only required an increased match of 100% of the first 4% of eligible compensation. Sprint Nextel ended up restructuring the plan to provide for an increased match of 100% of the first 5% of eligible compensation, and Mr. Parker testified that was the result of competitive considerations. All current Sprint Nextel employees, not just those who are plaintiff class members, are receiving the benefit of the increased match. Thus, it appears that the Increased Match aspect of the settlement was motivated as much by (and perhaps even more so by) other forces as it was by the settlement. The court is not persuaded that this aspect of the settlement itself confers such a significant benefit on the current Sprint Nextel employees as the IBEW objectors seem to believe that it does. Rather, it appears to the court that Sprint Nextel employees would have received a favorable restructuring of their retirement plan even in the absence of the settlement. And, significantly, because the parties chose to allocate this aspect of the settlement to the current Sprint Nextel employees, this freed up the Cash Settlement Fund so that it could be devoted entirely to former employees such as the IBEW objectors.

In addition to the court being unpersuaded that the Increased Match necessarily confers significant benefits on current Sprint Nextel employees insofar as it is labeled a provision of the settlement agreement itself, the court further notes that Embarq employees potentially stand to gain more than the current Sprint Nextel employees because they will

receive their portion of the Cash Settlement Fund (a benefit not conferred on current Sprint Nextel employees) plus they stand to benefit from amendments to their retirement plans similar to the Plan Amendments, as well. Although the parties have not attempted to place a value on the Plan Amendments, they obviously confer some value, perhaps even significant value, on those plaintiffs who will benefit from them. Notwithstanding the IBEW objectors' arguments to the contrary, the settlement does require Sprint Nextel to use its best efforts to implement similar plan amendments for Embarq employees. Simply because that has not yet occurred does not obviate the legal obligation that will arise upon final approval of the settlement by the court. The court rejects the IBEW objectors' argument that this provision of the settlement is illusory. This objection seems to be geared primarily toward forcing Embarq to place an offer on the table. But the settlement agreement does not require Embarq to extend such an unconditional offer; it only requires Sprint Nextel to use its "best efforts" to implement similar plan amendments. Regardless of the outcome that ultimately may come to fruition as a result of this provision, the court believes that the proposed settlement is sufficiently fair and reasonable as a whole and to the Embarq employees—union as well as non-union—that the court would approve the settlement even in the absence of the "best efforts" clause. This "best efforts" clause exists largely because of the logistics of the Embarq spin-off and the fact that the Embarq union employees are subject to a series of thirty-four separately negotiated collective bargaining agreements which are subject to renewal approximately every three years with approximately one-third of the agreements coming up for renegotiation each year. Many of these agreements already have in place

similar provisions to the Plan Amendments. Thus, the court finds the IBEW objectors' arguments in this regard to be without merit.

The court also finds the IBEW objectors' arguments concerning the duration of the Plan Amendments to be without merit. Under the plain language of the proposed settlement those Plan Amendments apply only to Sprint Nextel employees, not to Embarq employees. To the extent Embarq employees ultimately may receive the benefit of similar plan amendments by virtue of the "best efforts" clause, the court simply notes that the settlement agreement is subject to the duty of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in every contract. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreements are generally for three-year terms, and therefore it seems unlikely that any of the IBEW objectors would stand to benefit from similar plan amendments for less than three years.

Turning to the IBEW objectors' objection that the financial planning services are of no value to them because they already receive financial planning services through the local unions, the court also does not find that this consideration renders the settlement unfair, unreasonable, and/or inadequate. While these financial planning services may be of diminished value to these union members, the court simply cannot find that they are of NO value whatsoever to the IBEW objectors. The decision whether to take advantage of these sessions rests with each individual class member. The court also rejects the IBEW objectors' suggestion that Sprint should give them \$300 instead of the financial planning services. "The court may not modify the terms of a proposed settlement. Rather, a court must approve or

disapprove of the settlement as a whole.” 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.168, at 23-522 (3d ed. 2006).

The IBEW objectors’ objections to the form of the initial class notice are overruled as moot because the court approved a supplemental notice which was intended to address, among other things, the IBEW objectors’ original concerns regarding arguable ambiguities in the original class notice. The only lingering notice issue, then, is the objection Mr. Morton raised at the second fairness hearing that the supplemental notice deprives class members of fair notice because it states the Increased Match for current Sprint Nextel employees is valued at \$17.9 million when, in fact, the parties later placed a more accurate value on the Increased Match of approximately \$8.95 million. Although counsel for the IBEW objectors seems to advance this argument as a reason the court should withhold final approval of the settlement, the court believes that the more appropriate inquiry is whether a corrective notice should be issued. One of the policies of Rule 23’s notice provision is to protect class members from misleading communications from the parties or their counsel. *Erhardt v. Prudential Group*, 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, it would be within the court’s discretion to order a corrective notice to be issued to correct this arguably misleading statement. But, after careful consideration of this issue, the court determines that a corrective notice is unnecessary here because the supplemental notice was not materially misleading. The supplemental notice explains the Increased Match as follows:

The Increased Match involves an increased matching contribution from Sprint for the benefit of Sprint employees who participate in the Sprint Retirement Savings Plan or the equivalent plan which resulted from the merger

of Sprint and Nextel Communications, Inc. Under the Settlement, Sprint has agreed that . . . it will increase its matching contributions allocated to the accounts of Sprint employees who participate in the Sprint Retirement Savings Plan (but not the [SRS Plan BUE] or the [CRS Plan BUE]) to at least 100% of the first 4% of eligible compensation. Co-Lead Counsel and the Company believe that the guaranteed value of the Increased Match to the Settlement Class (referred to as the “Guaranteed Increased Match” in the remainder of this Supplemental Notice) is approximately \$17.9 million.

To be sure, at the time this supplemental notice was issued counsel and Sprint did, in fact, believe that the Increased Match had a value of approximately \$17.9 million; it was not until later that they realized this number was incorrect. Thus, the \$17.9 million number was an inadvertent misstatement at the time, albeit it was arguably misleading. Ultimately, however, the court does not believe that the \$17.9 million number was materially misleading because the notice did not state the number of plaintiffs who would share in this Increased Match and, consequently, the court doubts that class members reading the notice would have ascribed much significance to the \$17.9 million number because the notice did not provide the rest of the information they would have needed to translate that number into an estimated value for each recipient of the notice. The court believes that a class member plaintiff reading the notice probably would have focused more on the fact that the notice states Sprint is increasing its matching contribution to 100% of the first 4% of eligible compensation. This information provides each class member with the information he or she needs in order to be able to determine the value of the settlement to him or her. Thus, notwithstanding this discrepancy in the class notice, the court believes issuance of a corrective notice is unnecessary here.

For all of these reasons, then, all of the IBEW objectors' objections to the settlement are overruled. The court does note that it has given careful considerations to these objections because they have served the important function of focusing the court's attention on the arguable discrepancies between what various categories of class members are receiving. After close scrutiny of those discrepancies, the court nonetheless determines that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

*E. Objections of Bob Richard, Ralph Nesler, Stan Ruhnke, Rodger Ruhl, Frank Appodaca, and Melvin Simon*

Objectors Bob Richard, Ralph Nesler, Stan Ruhnke, Rodger Ruhl, Frank Appodaca, and Melvin Simon also were active objectors in this case. These class members are members of the local unions of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA). They filed written objections through counsel, and counsel appeared at the second fairness hearing on their behalf. The overall thrust of their objections is similar to the nature of the objections raised by the IBEW objectors. For the same reasons that those objections were overruled with respect to the IBEW objectors, then, those same objections are overruled with respect to the CWA objectors.

Additionally, the CWA objectors contend that the failure to include any members of the CWA in the settlement negotiations resulted in the proposed settlement inadequately compensating this portion of the class while providing substantially greater compensation to another portion of the class and reflected inherent unfairness in the negotiation process. The court disagrees. As explained previously, the court believes that Embarq employees

have fared adequately under the terms of the settlement. The law does not require involvement of absentee class members' attorneys in the settlement negotiation process. Moreover, the CWA objectors' interests were adequately represented by the named class members—in particular, by plaintiff Anton P. Spanier, who was a participant in the CRS Plan BUE. Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

*F. Objections of Cheryl Thomas-Lightner*

Cheryl Thomas-Lightner filed written objections to the settlement (doc. #262) in which she raises four different objections to the settlement. First, she contends that the different values of awards for the different classes of people are unfair and that all participants should share proportionately in the cash settlement fund. As explained above, the court has already determined that the plan of allocation is fair and reasonable.

Second, Ms. Thomas-Lightner contends that the de minimis amount is unfair. Again, as discussed previously, the plan of allocation excludes from participation in the Cash Settlement Fund those plan participants and former participants who would receive less than \$25. The court believes this de minimis floor is fair and reasonable in order to preserve the Cash Settlement Fund from excessive and unnecessary expenses in the overall interests of the class as a whole. *Cf. In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 225 F.R.D. 436, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding \$10 de minimis threshold in the allocation plan was reasonable).

Third, Ms. Thomas-Lightner contends that the amount of cash included in the settlement is unfair. She asks to have the \$300 for financial planning meetings deposited directly into her account. As explained previously, however, the court may not modify the

terms of the settlement, but instead must approve or disapprove of the settlement as a whole. Ms. Thomas-Lightner has the prerogative to decide whether to utilize the financial planning meetings. Whether she chooses to do so does not change the court's determination that the settlement as a whole is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Fourth, she complains about the Sprint stock options purchased as a part of Sprint's Management Incentive Plan. Like Mr. Cline's objection concerning the Sprint FON and PCS stock combination, this objection is based on considerations that are outside of the scope of this lawsuit. Consequently, this consideration is irrelevant to the settlement and release of the claims at issue in this lawsuit, which are confined to Sprint's 401(k) retirement savings plans. For all of these reasons, then, Ms. Thomas-Lightner's objections are overruled.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

In sum, the court concludes that the disparity in the value of relief among the different categories of class members is not as significant as the court had first understood it to be after the initial fairness hearing. Additionally, the court is satisfied that the disparities that exist were created in an attempt to maximize the settlement value for the class as a whole by allocating cash resources to former plan participants while capitalizing on the ability to restructure the retirement plans for current Sprint Nextel employees. Ultimately, the recovery for each of the categories of class member plaintiffs will depend upon a number of considerations such as their relative losses in the plans, their continued participation in the Sprint Nextel plans, and union negotiations. The court is satisfied that the settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated in a genuine effort to maximize recovery for the class as a

whole given the minimal amount of cash that Sprint was willing to contribute to settle this case. Moreover, Sprint's unwillingness to contribute more money to settle this case is fully justified given the serious questions of law and fact that exist placing the ultimate outcome of this litigation in doubt, particularly when combined with the fact that it is highly unlikely plaintiffs would have been able to obtain more favorable relief after protracted and expensive litigation. The court fully credits the parties' judgment, as well as the independent fiduciary's opinion, that the settlement is fair and reasonable. For all of these reasons, the court finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly, the settlement is approved.

**ATTORNEY FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES  
AND AN AWARD TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS**

Plaintiffs' attorneys ask the court to award \$3.9 million in fees and expenses and \$15,000 to each of the four named plaintiffs.<sup>4</sup> Section 8.4 of the settlement agreement requires Sprint to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, any court approved award to the named plaintiffs, and the costs of providing notice to class members and administering the settlement, up to a total maximum amount of \$3.9 million. Sprint states

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<sup>4</sup> It is not clear from this motion whether plaintiffs are requesting \$3.9 million plus \$15,000 to each of the four named plaintiffs or \$3.9 million out of which \$15,000 is to be paid to each of the four named plaintiffs. To be sure, the settlement agreement provides that any court approved award to the named plaintiffs is to come from the \$3.9 million Settlement Expense Fund. Thus, the court construes the request for an award to the named plaintiffs to conform to the terms of the settlement, meaning that award must come out of the \$3.9 million Settlement Expense Fund being requested by plaintiffs' counsel.

that it does not oppose this motion (doc. #240). The class was given notice of these anticipated requests, but no objectors raised any objections to these projected awards.

When there is a common fund created by a settlement, the court must apply one of two methods of determining reasonable attorneys' fee awards: the percentage of the fund method, or the lodestar method developed in the statutory fee shifting cases. *Rosenbaum v. MacAllister*, 64 F.3d 1439, 1445 (10th Cir. 1995). Under either methodology, the fee awarded must be reasonable. *Gottlieb v. Barry*, 43 F.3d 474, 482 (10th Cir. 1994). The preferred method in common fund cases is the percentage of the fund analysis. *Rosenbaum*, 64 F.3d at 1445. Regardless of which method is used, the court must consider the following twelve factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by the case, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. *Id.* & n.3. In this case, the court finds that after considering these twelve factors the requested fee is justified under both the percentage-of-the-fund and the lodestar methods.

As to the time and labor required (factor 1), counsel have submitted declarations stating they spent thousands of hours on this lawsuit during a time period spanning more than

three years. They conducted investigations of Sprint's 401(k) retirement plans before filing this lawsuit. They filed their initial pleadings in mid 2003; the cases were consolidated; they began preliminary discovery; they filed their initial consolidated pleading; they intervened during the settlement approval process in a previously filed securities fraud class action in order to prevent the ERISA claims in this case from being released; they devoted significant attention to responding to defendants' motions to dismiss; they commenced full blown discovery; and they filed a motion for class certification. They began to engage in settlement negotiations in February of 2005, these negotiations took many months, and the settlement agreement finally was signed in early 2006. The settlement approval process before this court has taken several months. It has involved two class notices, three rounds of briefing, and two fairness hearings. The countless hours plaintiffs' counsel devoted to this lawsuit clearly precluded them from spending that time on other cases (factor 4).

As the court alluded to previously in its discussion of whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, this case presented novel and difficult issues (factor 2). The applicable law is complex, unsettled, and in a rapid state of development. This case was "undesirable" (factor 10) from the start in the sense that the issues presented were inherently risky. Consequently, a high level of skill in this area of the law was necessary to perform the legal services in this case properly (factor 3). Plaintiffs' counsel possessed the requisite level of experience, reputation, and ability in the field of ERISA class actions and other complex litigation (factor 9). The high quality of plaintiffs' counsel's work culminated in the successful resolution of this complex case. This was demonstrated by their successful and

commendable prosecution of this case through the motion to dismiss stage and the ultimate settlement of this case under favorable terms.

Factors 6, 7, and 11 do not apply here. There was no prearranged fee in this case. Plaintiffs' counsel states there were no real time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances. And, plaintiffs' counsel states that the factor relating to the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client does not apply here.

The court turns, then, to the remaining three factors—the customary fee for similar work (factor 5), the amount involved and the results obtained (factor 8), and awards in similar cases (factor 12). The court is satisfied that the total value of the settlement in this case likely is well in excess of \$25 million. This includes the \$4 million Cash Settlement Fund, the \$1.6 million in Increased Vesting, and the \$8.95 Increased Match. Additionally, these amounts are net of the \$3.9 million Settlement Expense Fund which will cover attorneys' fees and expenses, including the cost of both class notices and the cost of retaining an independent fiduciary to review the fairness of the settlement. Although the parties have not devoted significant attention to attempting to place a value on the Plan Amendments and the Participant Communications Improvements, those aspects of the settlement are worth significant value to the class members which the court estimates to be in the range of millions of dollars. For example, the two one-hour meetings with a financial advisor, a \$350 value, are being made available to more than 67,000 class members. If only one-third of these class members elect to take advantage of those meetings, that confers an additional benefit of nearly \$8 million. Also, although it might be difficult to place a value on the "unlocking"

of matching contributions, the court is persuaded that this component of the settlement probably has a value well in excess of \$10 million. Plaintiffs have submitted a financial report that places a value on this “unlocking” component of the settlement of more than \$28 million and plaintiffs have directed the court’s attention to other authority suggesting that this component of the settlement probably has a value in the tens of millions of dollars. *See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 209 F.R.D. 94, 99 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (relying on an expert report which valued a similar unlocking component of a settlement at more than \$50 million; noting that “[r]ecent scholarly articles . . . strongly support the theory that employee retirement savings are quantifiably more valuable when diversified than when they are concentrated in an employer’s stock”). Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from Edwin J. Mills in which he opines that the plaintiffs’ recovery in this case might have been less than \$12 million based on the loss in the value of plan assets which could have been linked to the alleged misconduct in this case. Thus, the results obtained by virtue of the settlement are extraordinary compared to the anticipated difficulties of establishing significant amounts of damages even if plaintiffs could have overcome the numerous obstacles for establishing liability.

Based on a conservative value of the settlement of \$25 million, then, plaintiffs’ requested fees and expenses of \$3.9 million represent less than 16% of the benefit conferred on the plaintiff class members. The court has no difficulty concluding that this is an imminently reasonable percentage under the percentage-of-the-fund method based on the customary fee for similar work and awards in similar cases. *See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Barry*, 43

F.3d 474, 487-88 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding 22.5% of common fund was “well within the range of permissible reasonable fee awards” and citing case law for the proposition that 25% of the common fund is the benchmark); *see also In re Xcel Energy, Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.*, 364 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 (D. Minn. 2005) (approving attorneys fees of 25% plus expenses); *In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig.*, Case No. 02-4816, 2004 WL 2338151, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004) (approving set-aside of 20% of the cash component of the settlement fund for attorneys’ fees).

The court also finds that the requested fees and expenses of \$3.9 million are reasonable based on the lodestar method. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s collective lodestar is now \$3,046,545, plaintiffs’ counsel’s expenses to date are \$176,467, and the claims administrator’s costs for printing and mailing the class notice were \$81,631. Thus, plaintiffs’ total expenses thus far are \$258,098. Backing this expense out of the \$3.9 million, then, this leaves approximately \$3.6 million in attorneys’ fees, which results in a lodestar multiplier of only 1.18, a multiplier which the court finds to be imminently reasonable based on the risks associated with counsel taking on this case.

As to plaintiffs’ request for an award of \$15,000 to each of the named plaintiffs, however, the court simply cannot find that such an award is reasonable. Named plaintiff LaVonne Easter estimated that she spent 40 hours on this litigation; Jeffery Snethen estimated that he spent 84 hours on this litigation; Fran Lindholm estimated that he spent 83 hours on this litigation; and Anton P. Spanier estimated that he spent 110 hours on this litigation. The court certainly recognizes that the time these individuals devoted to this

lawsuit inured to the common benefit of the class and, to that end, the court believes they are entitled to some type of incentive award above and beyond what the typical class member is receiving. They have performed an important service to the class and the burden of this commitment deserves to be recognized through an award. But, although the aggregate value of the settlement is significant, no class member stands to gain more than \$1,000 on an average, per-plaintiff basis. The named plaintiffs devoted approximately 80 hours, on average, to this lawsuit. The court believes that an award of \$5,000 adequately compensates each of them for their time. *See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig.*, Case No. 02-4816, 2004 WL 2338151, at \*11 (approving an award of \$5,000 to each of the three named plaintiffs).

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT** that Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (doc. #229) is granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses and for an Award to the Plaintiffs (doc. #233) are granted in part and denied in part. The court hereby finally approves the parties' settlement and awards plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of \$3.9 million out of which \$5,000 is to be paid to each of the four named plaintiffs.

**IT IS SO ORDERED** this 3rd day of August, 2006.

s/ John W. Lungstrum

John W. Lungstrum  
United States District Judge

### **RESUME OF IZARD NOBEL LLP**

Izard Nobel LLP is one of the premier firms engaged in class action litigation on behalf of investors alleging misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. We are currently lead or primary counsel in many large securities or ERISA class actions, including cases against AT&T, AOL Time Warner, JDS Uniphase, Cable & Wireless, Sprint, and Tyco International. In the securities fraud class action against Campbell Soup Company, we represented the pension funds of the State of Connecticut as lead plaintiff. We settled the securities fraud class action on behalf of investors in Smallworldwide plc, for over 85% of the total losses claimed by class members.

Izard Nobel LLP (f/k/a Schatz Nobel Izard, P.C. or Schatz & Nobel, P.C.) has been formally appointed by many courts as lead counsel or co-lead counsel for investors in securities class actions, including Papanikolaou v. Value-Added Communications, et al., No. 3-95CV0346-H (N.D. Tex.), Gorga v. Uniroyal Chemical Corporation et al., No. CV-96-0132014-S (Conn. Super.); David v. Simware, Inc. et al., No. 96/602143 (N.Y. Sup.), Butler et al. v. Northstar Health Services, Inc. et al., No. 96-701 (W.D. Pa.), Allen, et al v. Johansson, et al., 397CV02172 (RNC) (D. Conn.), Feiner v. SS&C Technologies, Inc. et al., 397CV0656 (D. Conn.), Berti, et al. v. Videolan Technologies, Inc., et al., No. 3:97CV296H (W.D. Ky.), Ganino, et al v. Citizens Utilities Company, et al., No. 398CV00480 (JBA) (D. Conn.), Bunting, et al v. HealthCor Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 398CV0744-D (N.D. Tex.), Hirsch, et al. v. PSS World Medical, Inc., et al., No. 98 502 Civ. J20A (M.D. Fla.), Kenneth Blau, et al v. Douglas Murphy, et al., No. H 99 0535 (S.D. Tex.), Angres v. Smallworldwide plc, No. 99-K-1254 (D. Colo.), In re Complete Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 Civ. 1454 (S.D.N.Y.), Allain Roy v. dElia\*s, Inc., et al., No. 99 Civ. 3951 (JES) (S.D.N.Y.), Russo, et al v.

KTI, Inc., et al., No. 99-1780 (JAG) (D.N.J.); Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Company, et al., No. 00-152 (JEI) (D.N.J.); Hart v. Internet Wire, et al., No. 00 Civ. 6571 (S.D.N.Y.), Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. AW 00CV3508 (D. Md.), In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 00-12426-REK (D. Mass.), Karl L. Kapps, et al. v. Torch Offshore, Inc., et al., Case No. 02-CV-0582 (E.D. La), In re Cable and Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 02-1860 (E.D. Va), In re Alloy, Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. 03-CV-1597 (S.D.N.Y.), In re Surebeam Corporation Sec. Litig., Case No. 03-CV-1721 (S.D. Cal.); In re Primus Telecommunications Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master Case No. 04-970-A (E.D. Va.); In re Netopia Sec. Litig., Case No. C 04-3364 (N.D. Cal); Malasky v. IAC/InterActive Corp., et al., Case No. 04-CV-7447 (S.D.N.Y.); In re Supportsoft, Inc. Sec. Litig., C 04-5222 SI (N.D.Cal.); Berson v. Applied Signal Technology Inc. et al, 4:05-cv-01027-SBA (N.D.Cal.); The Cornelia I.. Crowell GST Trust v. Pemstar, Inc. et al., 05-CV-1182 (D. MN); UFCW Local 880 Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Fund v. Newmont Mining Corp. et al., No. 05-CV-01046 (D. Colo.); Aviva Partners v. Exide Technologies et al., 3:05-CV-03098 (D. NJ); In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 04-831 (D. Del.); In re Ionatron, Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. 06-354 (D. AZ); In re FX Energy, Inc. Securities Litigation., 2:07-CV-00874 (D. UT); and Melms v. Home Solutions of America et al., Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1961-N (N.D. Tex.).

We have also been responsible for many important decisions which have advanced the cause of shareholder protection through the federal securities laws, including in Ganino, et al v. Citizens Utilities Company, et al, 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000), In re Campbell Soup Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp.2d 574 (D.N.J. 2001), In re Complete Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F.Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), Angres v. Smallworldwide, plc, 94 F. Supp.2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2000), and Feiner v.S&C Technologies, Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d 250 (D. Conn. 1999).

In ERISA cases, Izard Nobel has been formally appointed as sole or co-lead counsel in Overby v. Tyco International, Ltd., No. 02-CV-1357-B (D.N.H.); In re Reliant Energy ERISA Litig., No. H-02-2051 (S.D. Tex.); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and ERISA Litig., MDL Docket No. 1500 (S.D.N.Y.); Furstenau v. AT&T, Case No. 02 CV 8853 (D.N.J.); In re AEP ERISA Litig., Case No. C2-03-67 (S.D.Ohio); Pettit v. JDS Uniphase Corporation, Civil Action No. 03-4743-CW (N.D.Cal.); In re Sprint Corporation ERISA Litig., Master File No. 2:03-cv-02202-JWL (D.Kan.); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., Case No. C 2-04-642 (S.D.Ohio); Spear v. Hartford Fin. Svcs Group. Inc., No. 04-1790 (D.Conn.); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative and ERISA Litig., MDL No. 1658 (D.N.J.); In re Diebold ERISA Litig. No. 5:06-CV- 0170 N.D.Ohio; In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ERISA Litig., Master File No. 06-CV-6297-MAT-MWP (W.D.N.Y.); In re Dell, Inc. ERISA Litig., Case No. 06-CA-758-SS (W.D. Tex.); and to the Steering Committee in Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913 (S.D. Tex.); In re Electronic Data Systems ERISA Litig., 3:02-cv-1323 (E.D.Tex.); In re Marsh ERISA Litig., Master File No. 04 cv 8157 (S.D.N.Y.); and In re First American Corp. ERISA Litigation, SA-CV07-1357 (C.D.Cal.). We are responsible for the seminal decision in Vivien v. Worldcom, Civil Action No. 2-01329 (N.D.Cal.), in which the Court in denying a motion to dismiss affirmed the legal theory upon which these cases are based.

#### PARTNERS

Jeffrey S. Nobel co-founded the firm in 1995. Mr. Nobel is a 1989 graduate of Albany Law School, where he served as an Associate Editor of its Law Review, and is also a 1986 *cum laude* graduate of the University of Connecticut, Storrs, where he received a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science.

Following his law school graduation in 1989, Mr. Nobel was employed as a litigation associate with the Hartford, Connecticut law firm of Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, where

he represented officers and directors in various securities class action cases, as well as

corporations and financial institutions in complex litigation matters.

Since co-founding the firm in 1995, Mr. Nobel has concentrated his practice on representing investors, consumers and employees harmed by corporate wrongdoing. Mr. Nobel is admitted to practice in Connecticut, and has prosecuted class action suits in numerous State and Federal courts throughout the country, including the District of Connecticut, the District of New Jersey, the District of Colorado, the Northern, Central and Southern Districts of California, the Northern and Southern Districts of Texas, the Southern District of New York, the Middle District of Florida, the District of Minnesota, and the Eastern District of Virginia.

Robert A. Izard is the former chair of the Commercial and Business Litigation Committee of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association. He leads the firm's ERISA team, which is at the forefront of retirement plan litigation in this country. He is lead counsel in many of the nation's most significant class actions, including cases against Merck, Tyco International, Time Warner, AT&T and Sprint among others.

Mr. Izard has substantial experience in other types of complex class action and commercial litigation matters. For example, he represented a class of milk purchasers in a price fixing case. He also represented a large gasoline terminal in a gasoline distribution monopolization lawsuit.

Prior to joining the firm, he was a partner at Robinson & Cole where he represented large corporate clients in a variety of business litigation matters. For example, he represented a large worker's compensation insurer in numerous class action lawsuits filed throughout the country concerning an alleged conspiracy to fix worker's compensation insurance rates.

As part of his twenty plus years litigating complex commercial cases, Mr. Izard has substantial jury and nonjury trial experience, including a seven-month jury trial in federal district

court. He is also experienced in various forms of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation and arbitration, and is a Distinguished Neutral for the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.

Mr. Izard is the author of *Lawyers and Lawsuits: A Guide to Litigation* published by Simon and Schuster and a contributing author to the *Mediation Practice Guide*.

He received his B.A. from Yale University and his J.D., with honors, from Emory University, where he was elected to the Order of the Coif and was an editor of the *Emory Law Journal*.

Seth R. Klein graduated *cum laude* from both Yale University and, in 1996, from the University of Michigan Law School, where he was a member of the Michigan Law Review and the Moot Court Board and where he was elected to the Order of the Coif. After clerking for the Hon. David M. Borden of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Mr. Klein served as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, where he specialized in consumer protection matters and was a founding member of the office's electronic commerce unit. Mr. Klein thereafter joined the reinsurance litigation group at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP in New York, where he focused on complex business disputes routinely involving hundreds of millions of dollars. At Izard Nobel LLP, Mr. Klein's practice continues to focus on consumer protection matters as well as on complex securities and antitrust litigation

Mark P. Kindall is a 1988 graduate of Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, where he served as Book Review Editor of the California Law Review and was elected to the Order of the Coif. He has a bachelor's degree in history with highest honors from the University of California at Riverside, and he also studied history at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.

Mr. Kindall was an associate at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C. from 1988 until 1990. In 1990 he joined the United States Environmental Protection Agency as an Attorney Advisor. He represented the U.S. government in international negotiations at the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the predecessor of the World Trade Organization. He was also a member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the “Earth Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Kindall joined the Connecticut Attorney General’s Office. As an Assistant Attorney General, he represented the State of Connecticut in numerous cases in federal and state court, as well as in various administrative tribunals. On several occasions, he argued appeals before the Connecticut Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In 2005, Mr. Kindall joined Izard Nobel LLP, where his practice has focused on securities, pension and consumer fraud cases.

Mr. Kindall has taught courses in appellate advocacy and administrative law at the University of Connecticut School of Law. He is admitted to practice in Connecticut, California, and the District of Columbia. He is also a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, and the United States District Courts for Connecticut, the District of Columbia, the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Districts of New York, and the Northern, Central and Southern Districts of California.

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William Bernarduci graduated from Bucknell University with a Business Administration degree and graduated *magna cum laude* from New York Law School, where he was a member of the New York Law School Law Review. Upon graduation, he served as a law clerk for the Honorable Nina Gershon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York.

His practice focuses on class action litigation in a variety of areas including ERISA, consumer and securities law, with a particular emphasis on litigation involving 401(k) retirement

plans.

Prior to joining the firm, Mr. Bernarduci was associated with the New York law firms Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher & Flom LLP and Dornbush Schaeffer, where he was involved primarily in complex commercial and securities litigation.

Mr. Bernarduci is admitted to the state and federal bars of Connecticut and New York, and is a member of the Connecticut Bar Association and the New York City Bar Association. He has had notable *pro bono* experience including a successful political asylum case on behalf of a Tibetan nun who was imprisoned for her political and religious activism.

#### ASSOCIATES

Wayne T. Boulton received his bachelor's degree, cum laude, from Colgate University, and received his law degree, with honors, from the University of Connecticut School of Law. Mr. Boulton served as Special Deputy Assistant States Attorney for the State of Connecticut before joining the law firm of O'Connell Flaherty & Attmore LLP in Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Boulton joined Schatz & Nobel P.C., in 2001.

Mr. Boulton has held numerous elected and appointed positions within the American Bar Association and the Connecticut Bar Association, including District Representative for the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island before the ABA's Young Lawyers Division. Through a compact between the ABA and the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Boulton became a director of Disaster Legal Services during recovery operations following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Mr. Boulton's practice at Schatz Nobel Izard has focused on Employee Benefits Law, including Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") litigation, as well as securities fraud and consumer class actions. His pro bono and community service work includes representation of the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut, including In re National

Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., and projects with the American Friends Service Committee.

Eric Palmquist graduated from Cornell Law School magna cum laude in 1999, where he was a member of the Cornell Law Review and elected Order of the Coif. Before joining Schatz Nobel Izard in 2004, Mr. Palmquist worked in the bankruptcy department at Dewey Ballantine LLP in New York City, where his work included representation of investors in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and at Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider in Hartford, Connecticut, where he represented clients in antitrust, patent and commercial litigations, including litigation to prevent anticompetitive practices in the contact lens industry.

Since joining Izard Nobel LLP Mr. Palmquist has focused his practice on cases involving consumer fraud, pension fraud and antitrust violations.

Nancy A. Kulesa graduated from Fordham University with a B.A. with honors in International Politics, and earned her Juris Doctor from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 2001. Ms. Kulesa also studied comparative and international law at the University of London. Prior to joining Izard Nobel LLP, Ms. Kulesa was involved in representing corporations seeking antitrust clearance of mergers and acquisitions.

Ms. Kulesa is involved in all of the firm's practice areas, with a primary focus on investigations, new cases and issues relating to the administration of individual and class actions.

Ms. Kulesa is admitted to the Connecticut Bar and the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.



Schatz Nobel Izard P.C.  
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July 14, 2008

**via certified mail, return receipt requested**

Jonathan K. Youngwood  
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP  
425 Lexington Avenue  
New York, NY 10017-3954

**Re: § 104(b)(4) Document Request: Lehman Brothers Savings Plan**

Dear Attorney Youngwood:

You represent fiduciaries of the Lehman Brothers Savings Plan ("Plan"). Our client, Jo Anne Buzzo, is a Participant in the Plan. Pursuant to ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), please provide me with the following documents: (1) a complete copy of the latest updated summary plan description(s); (2) the latest annual report(s); and (3) the bargaining agreements, trust agreements, contracts and other instruments under which this Plan is established and/or operated. With respect to documents in the last category, please include "any document or instrument that specifies procedures, formulas, methodologies, or schedules to be applied in determining or calculating a participant's or beneficiary's entitlement" under the Plan. See PWBA Opinion Letter No. 96-14A. Because the Plan is a 401(k) plan with various investment options, this category of documents should include any documents under which those options are established and operated: *e.g.*, prospectuses for the various funds policies and guidelines under which they were selected and monitored.

To the extent you can do so, please expedite this request and deliver the documents to me by overnight mail. We will pay your reasonable copying charges and postage upon receipt. If you require payment in advance, please contact me at the telephone number above to inform me of the same, and I will be happy to transfer funds to you.

If you are uncertain about the scope of the request, or dispute some part of this request, please, at a minimum send to me the documents identified in Nos. (1) - (3) above, and contact me regarding the documents which are disputed or as to which you believe the request is unclear.

If you have any questions, comments or concerns about this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your time and attention to this request.

Sincerely,

Wayne T. Boulton



Schatz Nobel Izard P.C.  
Attorneys at Law

20 Church Street Phone 860 493 6292  
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Hartford, CT 06103 www.snilaw.com

via certified mail

July 14, 2008

U.S. Department of Labor  
Office of the Solicitor  
N-4611  
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20210

U.S. Treasury Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
Room 3000  
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Sir/Madam:

As required by 29 U.S.C. §1132(h), please find a copy of the complaint filed in the following action:

**Buzzo v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08 Civ. 6245 (S.D.N.Y.)**

Sincerely,

Wayne Boulton